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Problem of Evil in Christian and Muslim Philosophy
With Special Reference to St. Augustine, Imam Al-Ghazali
and St. Thomas Aquinas


ABSTRACT

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A BRIEF ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS



The problem of Evil is one of the ancient problems and the old controversy between pessimists and optimists regarding this problem still persists. This is a problem not only for theists but also for all sensitive persons. In the present thesis we have discussed the metaphysical question regarding good and evil and its kinds in a theosophical framework that is if God created the world or if He sustains, manages or supervises it, and if God is infinitely good, how shall we explain all the pain and evil, the sin and sorrow, and the suffering and disappointments which are evident everywhere in the world? There are quite a number of adequate solutions of the problem of Evil presented by different thinkers. But in the present thesis we are mainly concerned with the solutions presented by St. Augustine, Imam Al-Ghazali and St. Thomas Aquinas.

St. Augustine was born in 354 A.D. and he died in 430 A.D. He was the precursor of medieval period and scholastic philosophy. He tried to solve the problem of Evil through the conception of "Privation of good". He classified evil into two categories, "Cosmic evil", and "Moral evil".

He justifies cosmic evil through the doctrine of "nature". He argues that the source of existence is God and

God is good, therefore He can not create evil. He further says that nature is also created by God, therefore, nature is not evil. But the corruption of this nature is evil. And this corruption can not be of the whole being. Thus he justifies cosmic evil through infinite wisdom and absolute goodness of God who ordains all and whose ways are beyond human understanding.

He explains moral evil on the basis of free will. He admits that God has given man free will. Will is good because it is created by God. But the turning of will towards mutable good instead of immutable good is evil. Because man's chief good is the good of the both, the body and the soul. The good of soul is the perfect satisfaction which depends on ultimate happiness which can be attained by chief good and chief good is God; therefore, the turning of the will towards mutable good is evil. Evil lies neither in the will nor in mutable objects, but only in turning of the will towards the lower than the higher good.

Imam Al-Ghazali was born at Tus in 1058 A.D. and died in 1111 A.D. He was a great theologian and profound philosopher. There is no description of cosmic evil in Al Ghazali's system. He believed that every thing in the world is in the grip of God. There is divine purpose linking the antecedent to the consequent and this divine purpose is manifested

in the existing orderly succession of events without the least break or irregularity. Divine purpose is a mystical one. Every one can not know it. Thus he remained silent so far the cosmic evil was concerned.

He called moral evil as Shar. It is the prohibitions of God and Khair (good) is the commandment of God. He explains moral evil through the doctrine of free will and doctrine of "Kasab" (acquisition).

Firstly he explained the nature of man, i.e. both material and spiritual. He says that human heart is susceptible to both the elements, i.e. Satanic and Divine element. Then he analysed human action, i.e. natural, intentional and voluntary one. All human actions are directed to some end. Al-Ghazali calls this end as Sa'ada (Blessedness) which lies in the realization of perfection. Man's perfection is in the vision of God which is the Summum Bonum. Man's will is neither free nor determined. Al-Ghazali called this position as "Kasab" (acquisition). Therefore he presented sequence theory of causation. But it is in the hand of man either to use his power in the right direction or in the wrong direction. The wrong direction is the dominance of the Quwat-i Shataniya (Devilic power); when Shatanic power dominates evil occurs.

St. Thomas Aquinas was born in 1225 A.D. in Italy and died on 7th March 1274 A.D. at the Abbey of Fessamoya. There

is the culmination of Scholasticism in his system. He was the follower of Aristotle, but he was also influenced by Plotinus, St. Augustine and Muslim Philosophers.

In solving the problem of evil he agreed with St. Augustine that "Evil is Privation of Good". He classified evil into two (a) Evil in being and (b) Evil in action. He believed that being in itself is good because it proceeds from God who is all Good. Secondly there is a gradation of goods. Like St. Augustine he also justifies this gradation through Divine wisdom. He explained moral evil like St. Augustine and Imam Al-Ghazali on the basis of free will and he made an analysis of actions. He argues that the goodness of an action depends on two elements, viz. (i) formal element which relates to the end towards which the act is directed and (ii) the material element which is related to the means that is adopted to attain that end and circumstances that are connected with the choice of the means. If all these are bad the action is evil.

He, further, explains will. According to him will is natural and wills something naturally. Therefore will is free to move towards end and to choose its means, but inspite of this freedom its actions can be controlled by reason, i.e. by man. Therefore man is responsible for the action of his will.

The present thesis consists of the following heads:

Chapter I - Introduction:

A brief historical survey of the problem of evil in the background of history of philosophy

Chapter II - St. Augustine:

- (a) Life and times of St. Augustine
- (b) His metaphysics
- (c) His conception of evil

Chapter III- Imam al-Ghazali:

- (a) Life and times of Al-Ghazali
- (b) His metaphysics
- (c) Conception of evil

Chapter IV- St. Thomas Aquinas:

- (a) Life and times of St. Thomas Aquinas
- (b) His metaphysics
- (c) His conception of Evil

Chapter V- Conclusion

A critical evaluation of the problem of Evil in the philosophy of St. Augustine, Imam Al-Ghazali and St. Thomas Aquinas

In conclusion we can say that all these three philosophers were primarily the scholars of religion and they dealt with the problem in their own way. They share each other on many points. St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas do not believe in the existence of evil in real sense but they call it as a lesser good in respect of higher good. But evil is evil. We can not call it lesser good or good in itself as the blindness of man or the suffering of innocent can not be called lesser good. Though these evils can be justified by saying that God punishes the wicked nations for their evil deeds, yet what remains unexplained is the fact that the innocent persons should not be punished. Secondly the solution of Evil as the privation of good seems contradictory in itself. The absence of good is not possible in nature which is good in itself.

Now it is clear that evil is not good in any form, it is different from good. So far moral evil is concerned the stand may be appreciated that good and evil are based on the pronouncement of God. He also gave freedom of will to man, so that he may choose between good and evil. This choice would have been impossible without the alternatives and without choice free will would have no meaning and there

would not be any justification for reward and punishment in the next world. That is why St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas and Imam Al-Ghazali preached the freedom of man. In this way man is responsible for moral evil as he has the free will.



ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY



Aligarh...25 February 1976

This is to certify that the Thesis entitled
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with special reference to St. Augustine, Imam
Al-Ghazali and St. Thomas Aquinas is the original
work of Miss Razia Khatoon and is suitable for
submission for the award of Ph.D. degree in
Philosophy.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, likely belonging to Dr. Mohd. Noor Nabi.

Dr Mohd. Noor Nabi
SUPERVISOR

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FIRST

I N T R O D U C T I O N

**

I N T R O D U C T I O N

When we see around the world in which we live we have to face storms, earthquakes, floods, drought, famines, deaths, mental suffering, blindness, strifes, murders, robbery etc. in our daily life. What are these? No one can deny that these are the evils, then automatically a question arises, what is evil?

The existence of evil is one of the oldest problems which has caused perplexity to the philosophers through all the ages from the earliest time. The abstract notion of good and evil began to be reflected upon since the time when man began to reflect upon himself. We find the discussion on this problem in the scriptures such as Rigveda, the Bible and the Quran and as well as in the discourses of noted eastern and western philosophers. Even today it is the most burning problem.

This problem is very significant for those who believe that God is Omnipotent, All Good and Creator of all things. The difficulty arises as to how the problem of evil can be reconciled with the omnipotence and goodness of God. As Joice says, "The existence of evil in the world must at all times be the greatest of all problems which the mind

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encounters when it reflects on God and His relation to the world. If He is indeed all good and all powerful, how has evil any place in the world which He has made? If He is all good why did He allow it to arise, if all powerful, why does He not deliver us from the burden¹?

In order to understand the problem of evil it would be better first to have a clear notion of evil. "The meanings and implications of good and evil are most varied such as 'good person, good action, good carpenter etc'. In all cases, in pronouncing a thing good we are judging its value, and the meaning of 'good' or its opposite in any particular case depends on the point of view from which we judge. It may be a purely quantitative judgement, a judgement of sensuous value or an aesthetic one. The good may mean 'well being' or 'well doing' but 'evil is the opposite of the both'; it means ill of good. As its meaning differs from context to context, it has been defined differently by different thinkers².

In the words of Naville, "Good is what ought to be, and evil is what ought not to be". But this definition is open to two objections. Firstly the term 'ought' does not apply to the irrational objects like field and table. Secondly 'what ought to be' means 'what is right', which is quite different from 'what is good', because right means

'according to rules', compelling or prescribing power of that ideal while 'good' means 'valuable' for some end and implies its attractive power of the ideal.³

To Sidgwick "the good in all its sense is the desirable, and evil is the undesirable. But here desirable does not necessarily imply pleasurable."⁴

Patrick holds that 'as higher and higher levels of good are successively realized, the lower levels become evil'.⁵ The significance is that there is no uniform standard among men as to what is evil -- what is one place is esteemed as virtue, in another place it is held to be vice, what some men approve most highly, other cannot find words to express their adherence.

So far the reality of evil is concerned there are two contrary views namely pessimistic and optimistic. For the pessimists the "World is full of misery". Evil is found everywhere in one form or the other. To lay emphasis on the misery of life a pessimist says:-

"Life which ye prize is long drawn agony". Thus for pessimists the very existence is an evil. They say, "No world would be better".⁶

They believe that God is not good, or what comes to the same thing that the goodness of God is something essentially different from what we in every other case understand by goodness. Therefore existence is evil and the root of all evil is the desire for existence. It is also accepted by Budhists. They maintain that final good is one never to be desired, never to be enjoyed, never to be consciously attained. In view of Schopenhawar "Will is the innermost essence of everything and of the totality of things. This will is blind, stupied and groping. He believes that world is so bad that non-existence would be preferable".⁷

On the other hand optimists hold that evil does not exist and even if it exists to some extent, it is promptly solved, conquered and it is good in other extend. They believe that:

good shall fall,
At last far off, at last to all
And every winter change to spring".⁸

The characteristic formula of all such theories is "Partial evil is universal good". As Boling Broke says, "Whatever is, is right, i.e. there is really no evil. Suffering is to be borne with content because the evil suffered is serving a great universal end. Nature is not to be rebuked for enforcing her laws at the expense of an individual. Therefore

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nature of evil exists not in the universe.

It may be said that evil appears only in particulars and that when we take a comprehensive view of the great whole it disappears; the world is indeed harmonious as a whole.

According to Stoics "Evil is the necessary condition, the correlate without which good is not conceivable. No evil, no good.¹⁰ In other words, they believe that evil is merely negative or privative conception meaning only the absence of good.

However, Pessimism and optimism, are not merely estimates of the extent to which evil exists; these are theories of origin, significance and final issue of evil. One who can adopt the pessimist estimate of the extent of evil may yet be an optimistic as holding that good is final goal of ill.

There are quite a number of adequate solutions of the problem of evil and some of these have been adopted by various thinkers, for example, some philosophers denied God's omnipotency and severely restricted its meaning. For some thinkers, 'Evil is an illusion'. According to them

the whole world of temporal and changing thing is nothing other than illusion and that what we call evil belongs only to this world, therefore evil is not really evil. They further argue that it is due to our necessarily limited and short sighted point of view as a finite being, our inability to see things as they really are from the stand point of eternity; 'Evil is the delusion of mind'.¹¹ Spinoza calls it "as darkness in us". But according to some, "Evil is an illusion. It is also inconsistent¹² thinking because this illusion is itself an evil. Secondly if evil or pain is due to our mind - since apart from mind it would not exist then to say that all suffering is a delusion of man's mind would be to make the existence of that mind the worst of evils. Thirdly if one of the fundamental elements of human experience is an illusion,^{12A} this fact is itself an evil.

According to some "Evil is necessary as a counter part to good" or "good cannot exist without evil". To them evil is not an unfortunate blot which the finished picture cannot help having; the blot is essential to its beauty; the artist deliberately put it, there it is an element contributing to the perfection of the whole, like a black cloud in one of Constable's picture. In the eternal things pain and sin are nothing to worry. But it limits

the omnipotency of God that God cannot create good without simultaneously creating evil. It may be said that omnipotence has never meant the power to do what is logically impossible, and on the present view the existence of good without evil would be logical impossibility. But this is also true that logic itself is created or laid down by God. Secondly this solution denies that evil is opposed to good in our original sense if good and evil are counter parts, a good thing will not "eliminate evil as far as it can. This doctrine implies that God not only permits evil, but that He deliberately creates it; He purposely does evil that good may come. The argument that the end justifies the means is as morally unjustifiable for God as for men. * "The universe is better with some evil in it than it could be if there were no evil".¹³ According to some, evil may contribute to the goodness of a whole in which it is found, so that the universe as a whole is better as it is, with some evil in it, than it would be if there were no evil. The best possible organization of the universe will not be static but progressive, that the gradual overcoming of evil by good is really a finer thing than would be the eternal unchallenged supremacy of good. It defends God's goodness and omnipotence on the ground that this is the best of all logically possible worlds, because it includes the important second order

goods and yet it admits that real evils, namely first order evil, exist. Good does not tend to eliminate evil in general. First order good (e.g. happiness) contrasts with first order evil (e.g. misery), these two are opposed in a fairly mechanical way; some second order goods (e.g. benevolence) try to maximise first order good and minimise first order evil; but God's goodness is not this, it is rather the will to maximise second order good. We might, therefore call God's goodness an example of a third order goodness, or good.
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There might, however, be several objections to this solution. As, some might argue that such qualities as benevolence have a merely derivative value, that they are not higher sorts of good, but merely means to good. Secondly it follows from this solution that God is not in our sense benevolent or sympathetic; He is not concerned to minimise evil, but only to promote good; and this might be a disturbing conclusion for some theists. Thirdly the analysis shows clearly the possibility of the existence of a second order evil, an evil contrasting with good, as evil contrasts with evil. This would include malevolence, cruelty, callousness, cowardice, and states in which good is decreasing and evil increasing.

"Evil is due to human free will". Evil is due to the independence of the actions of human being it is not to be ascribed to God at all. It is supposed to have been endowed by God with freedom of the will. God gave men freewill, although it would lead to some important evils, it must be argued that it is better on the whole that men should act freely, and sometimes err, than that they should be innocent automata, acting rightly in a wholly determined way.
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But to some 'if God has made men such that in their free choices they sometimes prefer what is good and sometimes what is evil, why could He not have made men such that they always freely choose the good? There was open to him the obviously better possibility of making beings who would act freely but always go right. His failure to avail himself of this possibility is inconsistent with His being both omnipotent and wholly good. But to some
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wrong choices is logically necessary for freedom'.

There are, in fact, many so-called solutions which purport to remove the contradiction without abandoning any of its constituents propositions. These must be fallacious, but it is not so easy to see in each case precisely where the fallacy lies. These fallacious solution often turn upon some equivocation with the words

'good' and 'evil', or upon some vagueness about the way in which good and evil are opposed to one another, or about how much is meant by 'Omnipotence'.

Thus evil is a problem for the theist in that a contradiction is involved in the fact of evil on the one hand, and the belief in the omnipotence and perfection of God on the other. God cannot be both all powerful and perfectly good if evil is real.

Evil may be classified into various categories. For convenience it may be broadly divided into two

- (1) "Evil which befalls us and which we suffer and endure"
- (2) Evil which we do"

" 17

These two broad categories may be further sub-divided into four classes:

- (1) Natural Evil
- (2) Physical Evil
- (3) Metaphysical Evil
- (4) Moral Evil

(1) N A T U R A L E V I L

Natural evil is the evil or pain inflicted upon humanity through particular arrangement of natural elements or forces in accordance with their sin as storm, famine,

flood and earthquake etc and evil with which so many are born, the various physical deformities and defects such as blindness, deafness and dumbness etc. Most of these evils contribute towards increasing human pain and suffering, but not all physical evils are reducible simply to pain. The natural evil creates not only one problem but a number of distinct problems. According to Joice "the actual amount of suffering which the human race endures is immense. Disease has a store of torments for the body: and disease and death are the lot to which we must all look forward. At all times, too great numbers of the race are pinched by want. In short the problem is not one that results from looking at only one aspect of the universe. It may be the case that over all pleasures predominate the pain and that physical good, in general, predominates over physical evil." 18

(2) PHYSICAL EVIL

'Physical evil means all the sufferings, a man may have to endure with bodily and mental, nervous and sympathetic, alike as a distinct individual and social unit, alike as a natural being-fleshy and mortal and as a human being, sharing in the special history of people and in the collective fortune and immortality of the race'. 19

No doubt the animals too have sufferings and pain and sustain injury due to natural evil and in case of human

being the possible explanation for that may be moral evil but it cannot be applied to animals. The Augustinian Christian Theodocy tries to justify the animals suffering on the basis of fall of Adam. They say that fall of Satan perverted the entire evolutionary process to a savage struggle for existence. According to eastern theodocy animal suffering is explained on the basis of doctrine of re-birth, re-incarnation of soul. A re-born in animal is due to his²⁰ evil actions.

(3) METAPHYSICAL EVIL

The finitude, contingency and hence imperfection of all created things have been called by some thinkers as metaphysical evil. "Metaphysical evil (the fact that we are finite) is not evil at all. 'To be finite is unsatisfactory, says Royce but it is scarcely a thing to complain about, if we actually find, the finitude is capable of indefinite expansion, and if, we have ground for hoping, this is destined to be immortal. When knowledge can not be extended, when possibilities of discovery and invention have been exhausted, it may be time to find our finitude²¹ an evil. When our world is conquered, we may weep".

This is the evil which is inflicted upon beings by God as a punishment of their sins which are committed on

account of imperfect, inherent nature through natural agencies or physical element.

(4) M O R A L E V I L

Moral evil is purely the outcome of the human actions, particularly of his voluntary actions. Moral evil is simply immorality, Evil such as selfishness, envy, greed, deceit, cruelty, callousness, cowardice and the larger scale evils such as wars and the atrocities they involve. It may also be called sin, therefore, its problem is nothing other than that of sin. This is what is most perplexing, persistent and difficult to overcome. And this is what has found greatest treatment by the philosophers, theologians and saints and this is what creates a dilemma between man's free will and God's goodness and Omnipotence. There is a room for moral evil only where there is freedom of will because acts done under compulsion have nothing to do with morality. One who does good deeds is said to be morally good and one who commits evil ones is stamped as morally evil provided he enjoys the freedom of will.

"We may hold that it was God's purpose to have in man not merely an intelligent fellow-worker, but a moral being who should be partly the architect of his own character and worth", therefore, a man is better who may do evil

than a man who cannot do evil. The possibility of evil is always possible for a moral being. Further we may say that the possibility of evil is necessary for a moral being. Further we may find that God wills not merely the possibility, but the actuality of evil. Because the "actuality of evil is the only ground we can see on which there arises any need or a possibility for the manifestation and development of some human virtues, and the revelation of some Divine excellence, which we regard as among the best".²³

Similarly for the theists "moral evil must be interpreted as a breach of God's law and as a rejection of God himself. It may involve the eternal damnation of the sinner, and in many of its forms it involves the infliction of suffering on other persons. Thus it aggravates the problem of physical evil, but its own peculiar character consists in the fact of sin. How could a morally perfect, all powerful God create a universe in which occur such moral evils as cruelty, cowardice and hatred, the more especially as these evils constitute a rejection of God Himself by His creations²⁴ and as such involve them in eternal damnation.

Now it is clear that evils are of different kinds and raise different questions and of all kinds two questions may be asked, "what is the terminus a quo and what is the

terminus and quem"? ²⁵

The problem of evil exists in most acute perplexing form for those holding a theistic view. Just in proportion as God is held to be omnipotent, all wise, all loving, the blessed and the only potentate, the creator, the Disposer of events and so on, the existence of evil becomes an ever deeper mystery. It is meaningless to criticize and protest against the scheme of things as we find it, if there is no one responsible for it, Who, we can conceive rightly or wrongly, might or should have made it other than it is. According to Job, "O that I knew where I might find him ! that I might come even to his seat! I would order my cause before him and fill my mouth with arguments. I would know the words which he would answer me, and understand what he would say unto me". ²⁶

Thus all the problems of evil merge into one - the ²⁷ problem of Theodicy: Si Deus bonus est unde Malum.

After discussing the kinds of evil, now we present the various approaches to the problem of evil.

G R E E K A P P R O A C H

Greek approach may be divided into many phases such

as (i) Pre-Platonic (ii) Platonic (iii) Aristotelian
(iv) Stoic and (v) Greco-religious approach.

Pre-Platonic approach is an optimistic one. To them there was no evil as a whole we see the things according to them, individually good and evil. But God sees harmony and in harmony there is no evil rather than it is another good because it is part of the harmony. This was the theistic point of view but Atomists argued that "goal of life is happiness and it was an inner condition or state of tranquillity which depends upon harmony of the soul, a balance of life, an attitude which combines reflection and reason". As Democritus says, "Goodness was not only a matter of action but depended upon man's inner desire".²⁸ The good man is one who does good but one who wants to do good at all times such goodness brings happiness. On the other hand according to sophists the evil does not exist in itself but everything in itself is indifferent. Its goodness or evil depends on man. To them goodness does not lie in harmony but it depends purely on individual thinking of man as Protagoras says: "Man is the measure of all things".²⁹ Therefore in Pre-Platonic approach each man had his own code of good and evil. To them morality was as mere conventional habit. That actually there was no moral law, no all-inclusive principles of right and wrong. The result of this position was moral anarchy and pure individualism.

(ii) In Platonic approach this problem is tackled in a different way. According to Plato³⁰ the world of sense is unreal, fleeting, changing. This is evil. It is not illusionary but it exists in a form of sensual world. This sensual world is lower than the ideal world which is unchangeable and which can be known through reason. "Reason therefore, is the highest good for man". On the other hand through senses one can know only this physical world, which is a shadow of reality. According to Plato happiness and goodness go together and this happiness can be attained only in good life and good life is possible only when reason rules the lower will and appetites because if one indulges in these lower appetites, he turns away from highest good and it is evil. This evil can be overcome by surpassing lower desires and appetites.³⁰ Goodness comes because one has met evil and overcome it, and thus he has made a real choice and has chosen well. Therefore, man is not determined in the universe, but is able to choose and is free to determine his own fate.³¹ This approach is followed by christian scholastics or medieval thinkers, specially by St. Augustine, a great scholastic thinker and precursor of medieval period.

(iii) The another important approach is Aristotelian approach. Though Aristotle was influenced by Plato but his trend was rational and practical. Reason or true knowledge in his opinion is good but it is treated only as good and

not as the highest good but the "self realization is the
³²highest good". Man has not only reason but he has feeling,
 desire and instincts also, and when all these factors are
 realized in perfect harmony, it is the highest good. The
 aim of everything in the universe is to realize itself to
 the fullest sense. Each thing is different from all others.
 It has certain talents and abilities and when these talents
 and abilities are realized in a fullest sense it is good.
 Therefore self realization is the highest good and this self
 realization is the complete realization of reason and this
 realization brings happiness. To Aristotle actions conducive
 to the attainment of this good or end are good and right.
 And the actions opposed to the attainment of this true good
³³are wrong (evil). Man is free to strive for that which is
 in him. The ultimate choice is with man. Aristotle says,
 "Virtue as well as evil lie in our power; we are free to
 do that which is good or to do that which is evil. There
 is no power in the universe which can force anything on us.
 In other words, virtue is a disposition or habit involving
 deliberate purpose or choice. The good man, he held, was
 one who made the right choice and through the force of his
 will realized the best. The bad man was one who made the
³⁴wrong choice." The Aristotelian approach was an intellec-
 tual one and we find the echo of this intellectual approach
 in the teachings of Thomas Aquinas in medieval period.

(iv) After Platonic and Aristotelian approach we come to stoic approach which is midway between early Greeks and later Greeks.

According to them man's highest good lies in acting in harmony with the universe. Man is a part of universe, with a definite function to perform for the complete development of the whole universe. As the ruling power in the universe is reason, so reason should rule each man in individual action. To them "man's will is determined" and "Everything in the universe has its beginning and source in the will of God. God is the ruler and determiner. Everything which has evolved has been the result of God's purpose," therefore, evil can not be conceived without good. In short this approach seems to be optimistic and though they were purely determinists but when they come to the problem of good and evil," they abandon the complete determinism of their metaphysics. A man, in their opinion, may give himself to his passions and become their slave or he may escape from his passions and, rise to a moral life. Thus he conquers his passions and becomes free. A true freedom lies in following reason and realizing supreme good.³⁵ The Stoic conceived "goodness as a harmony within the universe and evil as an imaginary.³⁶ "

(v) After Plato and Aristotle men were turning towards religion and seeking comfort in it. They were confused and lost among the many conflicting theories of evil which had been developed in the past. The time was ripe then for merging the many religious doctrines or beliefs with one or more of the Greek philosophies which had come down to that day. With the rise of the religious movement in philosophy a sharp distinction was made between the principles of good and evil, light and darkness, life and death. In many instances they conceived special God ruling over each realm,³⁷ as Manichians maintained a dualistic theory. According to them, there are two ultimate principles, that of light, and an evil principle that of darkness. They are eternal and their strive is eternal and this world is the result of the mutual conflict of these two principles. In man the soul composed of light is the work of good principle while the body composed of grosser matter is the work of evil principle. Thus the soul or spiritual being is good and body or material thing is evil. On the other hand in Neo-Platonic approach this dualistic problem is tackled monistically. They agree that in man there are two different realities, spiritual and material and "consequently when the soul is incorporated in the body, it suffers a fall from Divine perfection and becomes pre-disposed to evil."³⁸ "The goal of man is freedom from body and all its sins and return to God and perfect Goodness." To them

this is possible because soul is a part of the Divine or the world soul and possesses pure intelligence. "It can turn away from God towards body and from the body towards God and regain its freedom. Thus for Neo-Platonists, God, the source of everything in the universe, is absolutely good, perfect bliss and can not be the cause of evil."³⁹

Therefore, they presented the theory of Emanation. According to this theory "out of a pure God flow beings, as a stream might flow from an inexhaustible source. And at the far extreme is darkness or matter."⁴⁰ Thus matter does not exist in itself or positively but it is merely a privation of good. The evil, therefore, is nothing other than "Privation of good".

After Greco-religious approach we come to Christian approach. Christian approach may be divided into two, (i) early Christians and (ii) the later Christians.

VI. The early Christian thinkers had to face the dilemma as to how the existence of evil might be reconciled with absolute good, perfect and all powerful God. They followed Neo-Platonic and Aristotelian approach. Early Christian thinkers such as St. Augustine and Anselm were the followers of Plotinus and Neo-Platonists, while St. Aquinas was the follower of Aristotle.

According to them God is eternal, unchanging and good and He is the first cause of everything in the universe. He is the creator of the universe. He is an abiding principle in all changes, the eternal pattern which never changes. He is the unity of all forms and all ideas. The world is created through Divine Emanation and everything in the world so far as it is a part of God, strives to be more like God to return to Him. But matter holds them back and its turning from God is evil. As Apologists says that God created man good but he turned from God to the flesh, the body. By this, sin came into the world.⁴¹ And he turned towards flesh on account of his freedom of will.

According to them God created man with free will, when he goes towards God through his will it is good and when he turns it away from God it becomes evil. While Augustine says, "Man should turn his back on the pleasures of this world which are thin and Pale and direct his attention⁴² wholly to God who is perfect goodness".

But Augustine denied the individual freedom.⁴³ For him mankind was free in Adam, but since Adam chose to sin he lost freedom not only for himself but for all mankind. Now no one is free, but all are bound to sin, are slaves of evil. Thus in his thought man is free and determined at a time. To him Adam's sin became hereditary, with the result

that the future of every man is completely determined. But it does not mean that evil is created by God because God created first man with free will and the first man himself chose sin and by the act of first man, his future is sealed and this turning away from God is evil.⁴⁴ Thus evil is privation of the right order in the man's will. Now it is the grace of God due to which a man can get rid of evil and attain goodness and salvation. Then evil is only a lack of good. He explains the problem with a simile, i.e. everything in the universe is good, even that which appears to be evil to us, is actually good in that it fits into the whold pattern of the universe as shadow or darkspot⁴⁵ is necessary for the beauty of a painting.

Evil, to him, is a relative term. Where there is good, there is a possibility of evil. If there is evil,⁴⁶ good is must because evil is good in itself.

This general idea was carried over into the period of Christian thought known as Scholasticism, from the ninth to the thirteenth century. By this time Christian Church dominated everything - the State, man's lives, education and thought. The thinkers had to confine their thinking to the belief which the Church accepted. Thus, all thinking was limited to church doctrines. In most cases men attempted to show that the beliefs of the church were true, reasonable.

The position of Augustine is also held very largely by the philosophers of Scholasticism. Believing in all-good God who created everything, they had to explain apparent evil as actually a part of the good as a whole and thus actually good. According to Abelard "the rightness or wrongness of an act does not lie in the act itself but in the intention of the actor. And God considers not what is done, but in what spirit it is done; and the merit or praise of the agent lies not in the deed, but in the intention".⁴⁷ The truly sinful man is one who acts with a desire to do wrong.

This scholastic movement, with its problems and difficulties, reaches its climax in Thomas Aquinas. Thomas Aquinas tried to show that the universe as a revelation of God is rational. In his theory of good and evil we find the philosophy of Aristotle joined with the basic principles of Christianity.. God made everything, including man, for a purpose, and the highest good of all things is the realization of this purpose. As one realizes the purpose for which he was created, he reveals God's goodness. Therefore, "the highest good is the realization of oneself as God⁴⁸ has ordained".

Similarly the highest form of action is the contemplation of God. This may be done through reason and faith.

Further, he says, "the goodness or badness of a particular action depends upon the aim or purpose of the actor. Intention will not make a bad act good, but it is the Divine ⁴⁹ purpose that will make a good act truly good". Evil to him, is the privation, a lack of the good. All things created by good God, aim at goodness. When they fail, evil results.

In short Christian scholastic thinkers emphasized the great gulf between God and all that is less than God. Goodness is created by God and is to be found in adjustment to God's plan or purpose. Evil is in some way, attached to matter, the body, or the world. But God being the sole Creator of the Universe, would not create evil. Therefore, evil must not actually be evil, but must be part of the great good. They were confronted with the fact of human degradation. Consequently "they had to tie this up with the body, the sinful will of man which was in some way inherited from Adam, or the perversity of matter". ⁵⁰

Muslim Approach: After Christian approach we now come to Muslim approach. Muslims believe that "God is a living, self-subsisting, eternal, and absolutely free creative reality which is One, all powerful, all knowing, all beauty, most just, most loving and all good. It is He, the creator, who began the process of creation. There is nothing to oppose

His will. He is creator, evolver and restorer of all forms. He is also the cherisher, sustainer, protector, helper guide and reliever of distress and suffering. God is all knowing and He is the best judge".

In short "God is all good, free from all evil, He is also the source of all good. The Quran lays a great stress on the beauty of action. It exhorts mankind to do the deeds of high value. Man is the best of creation for God has created him in the most beautiful form, he is born with the Divine spirit breathed into him; he is made in the image of God."
51

Human perfection consists in the fullest achievement and assimilation of Divine attributes, for God desires nothing, but the realization of His light, the realization of His attributes in man. God has given man the will to choose, decide, and resolve to do good or evil, he has endowed him with reason. Whatever evil comes from him, or to him is from his own soul. His plan envisages man's free use of the Divine attribute of power or freedom to choose and take all judicious and precautionary measures to suit different situations. In the providential scheme man's role is not that of a blind, deaf, dumb and driven herd of goats, so even his free choice of evil is a part of scheme of things and no one will choose a way unto God, unless it fits into that

scheme or is willed by God. He is given the power to distinguish between good and evil and, therefore, he alone is responsible for what he does. He is endowed with freedom of action, but his freedom is limited by the free causality of God. His responsibility is proportionate to his powers; he has been shown the path of righteousness and it is up to him to accept the path of good or evil.⁵²

Being created after the pattern of God's nature man is capable of developing from one stage to the next higher stage. But this development involves struggle against the immoral forces of the external world which he is able to meet successfully with the co-operation and help of God.

To realize the moral law in his individual and social life, man has often to struggle against evil forces represented in the person of Satan. But it is within his power to resist and overcome them. Though man is always prone to weakness and susceptible to seduction by the forces of evil, yet his weakness is rectifiable under the guidance of revelation, and such men as follow the law of righteousness shall be immune from these lapses.⁵³

"The Quran refers to several stanic tendencies in man such as Pride and a conceit in times of prosperity, and false sense of self sufficiency".⁵⁴ These tendencies

often lead to different form of wrong-doing and, therefore, must be counteracted by all right-thinking people.

This is the main spirit of Muslim approach. But the problem of criterion of good and evil follows as a corollary to the problem of reason and revelation, and on this basis there are two main approaches, viz. (i) Mutazilite approach and (ii) Asharite approach.

Mutazilite Approach:

Mutazilite approach is purely a rationalistic approach. The Mutazilites believe that the reason is more fundamental than revelation. It is to be preferred to revelation. Revelation merely confirms what is accepted by reason and, if there be a conflict between the two, reason is to be preferred. They held that reason, and not revelation, is the criterion or standard of moral judgement, i.e. of the goodness and badness of an action. The truth and moral value of things and human actions must be determined by reason because the moral qualities of good and evil are objective; these are inherent in the very nature of things or actions and as such can be known by reason. They maintained that human reason is competent to know the verities of the universe and is completely free to go searching after the Truth. They interpret good and evil into three senses:

- (i) Gain and Loss : A thing in which there is gain, that is good and the thing which brings loss, is evil.
- (ii) Merit and Defect : A thing of merit is good but a thing having defect is evil.
- (iii) Reward and Punishment : A thing which is rewardable is good and a thing which is punishable is evil.

Reason is the absolute judge in all the three senses in judging as to what is good and what is evil. Through reason one knows that thankfulness, truthfulness and the like are right (hasan) and ingratitude, falsehood etc. are wrong (qabih) Shara simply confirms what is already pronounced by reason. They believe that things and acts are good in themselves and their goodness or rightness (husn) may be known by reason. This assertion implies that the meaning of the good or evil is completely rational. In short to them reason is the source of moral obligation. It not only informs what is good, but also commands it. Man is the creator of his volitional acts. He creates some acts by way of perception and cognition (mubasharah) and some by way of invitation (Taqlid). When man is the author of his own acts, it is necessary for God to reward him for his good deeds and this/be justly claimed by him, as Al-Sharastani

puts it. "The Mutazilites unanimously maintain that man decides upon and creates his acts, both good and evil, that he deserves reward and punishment in the next world for what he does. In this way the lord is safeguarded from association with any evil or wrong or any act of unbelief or transgression. For if He created the wrong He would be wrong".⁵⁷

They believe that wise can only do what is salutary (al-Salah) and good, and that God's wisdom always keeps in view what is salutary for His servants; therefore He can not be cruel to them. He can not bring into effect evil deeds. He can not renounce that which is salutary. He can not ask His servants to do that which is impossible. Further, "reason also suggests that God does not place a⁵⁸ burden on any creature greater than it can bear".

According to them, things are not good or evil because God declares them to be so. Goodness or evil are innate in the essence of things themselves. This very goodness or evil of things is the cause of the commands and prohibitions of the law. As Sharastani says, "beauty and ugliness are qualities belonging intrinsically to what is beautiful and ugly. The human intellect is capable of perceiving the goodness and evil of a few things and no laws are required to express their goodness and evil, e.g. it is

commendable to speak the truth and despicable to commit oneself to untruth. This shows that the evil and goodness⁵⁹ of things are obvious and require no proof from the Shariah.

In short they judge all Islamic beliefs by theoretical reason and renounce those that relate to all that lies beyond the reach of reason. They totally ignore the limitations of reason.

Asharite Approach:

Asharism is a philosophico-religious school of thought. It laid the foundation of an orthodox Islamic theology or orthodox Kalam, as opposed to the rationalist Kalam of Mutazilites and in opposition to the extreme orthodox class, it made use of the dialectical method for the defence of the authority of Divine revelation as applied to theological subjects.

According to Asharites, God is one, unique, eternal, existent Being. "He possesses attributes such as knowledge,⁶⁰ power, life, and will". They believe that God has attributes which inhere eternally in Him and are in addition to His essence. They held that revelation is more fundamental as the source of ultimate truth and reality, and reason what should merely confirm what is given by revelation and thus

they prefer revelation to reason. Islam is based on certain fundamental principles or concepts which, being super sensible in nature, are incapable of rational proof. These principles, first^{/must} be believed in on the basis of revelation. Revelation, thus, is the real basis of the truth and reality of the basic doctrines of Islam. This faith based on revelation, may be rationalized. Reason must, therefore, be subordinated to revelation. They held that revelation is the real authority or criterion to determine what is good and what is evil. "Goodness and badness of actions (husn wa qubah) are not qualities inhering in them; these are mere accident (a'rad). "Actions-in-themselves are neither good nor bad (evil), Divine law makes them good or bad (evil)".⁶¹

Good and evil, in their opinion, generally are used in three senses as are seen in the case of Mutazilites. (1) In the sense of perfection and defect respectively. (2) In the utilitarian sense, meaning gain and loss in worldly matter. (3) In the third sense of commendable and praiseworthy and punishable in this world and in the next world.

Both the Asharites and the Mutazilites agree that in the first and second senses, mentioned above, reason is the criterion or standard of good and evil. But according to Asharites the third sense must be known through revelation

and not by reason as it was held by Mutazilites. Revelation alone according to Asharites decides whether an action is good or evil. As actions by themselves are neither good nor evil; as there is no quality of good or evil seated in the very nature of an act, therefore there can be no question of knowing it by reason.

On the other hand on the question of free-will of man, to choose and produce actions they took up an intermediary position between the libertarian and fatalistic views. They made a distinction between creation (Khalq) and acquisition (Kasb) of an action. God is the creator (Khaliq) of human actions and man is the acquirer (Muk-tasib). Thus the actions of human beings are created by God, the creatures are not capable of creating any action. There is no creator except God and the actions of man are, ⁶² therefore, His creations".

To them power is either (1) Original (qadimah) or (ii) derived (Hadithah). The original power alone is effective. Derived power can create nothing and the power which is given to man is derived, therefore, man can not create any thing; he can not initiate work, because God creates in man the power and the ability to perform an act and to make a free choice (Ikhtiyar) between two alternatives, between right and wrong. But this free choice of man is

not effective in producing the action. In making this choice and intending to do the act, acquires (iktisab) either the merit and reward for right choice or demerit and punishment for wrong choice.

Thus, to them there are two causes in voluntary actions: (i) Effect of the real cause, God, (ii) The choice and intention of man, the acquirer. "God create in man the power, ability, choice, and will to perform an act, and man, endowed with the derived power, chooses freely one of the alternatives and intends or wills to do the action, and, corresponding to this intention, God creates the actions". It is this intention on the part of man which makes him responsible for his deeds. He can not take the initiative in any matter, nor can he originate any action. But the completion of the act is partially due to his intention, therefore, man's free choice is an occasion for God's causing the action corresponding to that choice. And this correspondence and harmony between the choice ^{of} man and God's creation, according to the Asharites, is not due to a harmony established by God previously, but because of His habit or ⁶³ nature to create the harmony whenever human action is done.

This school of thought believes that God is the only real cause of everything; He alone possesses real and effective power and this is unlimited; His will is absolutely

free - not determined by anything. Whatever power, human beings apparently possess, is given by God. Man does not possess any real and effective power, God, being absolutely free in His action, is not bound to act rationally and teleologically, for, otherwise, His actions would be determined by something external to and other than Himself and He would not remain absolutely free. External purpose would put a limit to God's omnipotence. He is not bound to do what is best for His creatures. He does whatever He wills. But as He is an absolutely intelligent and just being,⁶⁴ His actions, as a matter of fact, are all full of wisdom.

Modern Approach:

Modern philosophy wrestles with the same problem but has introduced many new elements in its attempt either to meet the original difficulty or to put the whole matter on different level.⁶⁵ The interpretations of problems were in many instances very different from those of middle ages. It became obvious that reason was very different from faith. Consequently, it happened many times that a philosopher was not a theologian.

With the Renaissance man undertook to free himself from the dominance of church and its doctrines. The human mind refused to be tied to the doctrines and beliefs of the church but aspired to search the problem with unblinded eyes.

It is a curious fact that as men undertook this search, they began to discover inexorable laws and mathematical consistencies by which every thing in the universe seemed to be controlled. They found the things happening in what appeared to them in mechanical ways. They, therefore, interpreted the entire universe on materialistic basis. Thus good and evil were for them matters in motion. When motion is successful, it generates pleasure, and when it is a failure, pain results. But good and evil are relative to the particular man. That which pleases one man may not please another. Consequently, there can be no absolute criterion⁶⁶ for good and evil.

To spinoza "Everything which helps man to reach the goal of his striving is good. The highest good of man is the complete realization of his striving."⁶⁷ But Descartes tried to reconcile the mechanical theories of his time with the ideas of God, soul, and freedom. His solution lies in making a sharp distinction between soul and body. The body is governed by mechanical laws but the soul is free. It wills as an active principle. It is free to will, to love and not to love God.⁶⁸ Further he said that "God is perfect and incapable of causing us to error. But man does fall into error and suffer from mistakes. This is explained on the theory that the power which God has given to man to distinguish the true from the false is not complete. Thus, man is often guilty of making judgments and in such cases he may

choose that which is wrong, evil, rather than good. Thus⁶⁹ error lies not in God's action but in ours. Leibnitz tackled the problem in the same manner as Descartes. Man, for him is, composed of a number of monads well organized, so⁷⁰ man must be free from external influences. Thus in the universe of monads how is evil possible? He thought that "World is the best possible world, but it is not perfect". God limited Himself when He expressed Himself in finites. These limits results in suffering and sin. But evil serves to make good really good. Man has certain innate principles, which, if followed logically, led to criteria of good and⁷¹ evil.

Contemporary Approach:

Recent philosophic thought regarding the problem of good and evil has been concerned with man's social relationship. It has been an ethics of the human group rather than that of Divine laws. Consequently, it has taken on the tinge of relativity. "Goodness and evil become qualities of acts related to the situation in which these are performed. According to Mill "Goods differ in quality and that the goods of the intellect are better than the goods of the senses."⁷² To Bentham too, good is the measure of good in term of the "greatest good of the greatest number".⁷³ But he does not admit that goods differ in quality. His only criterion is the number of individuals affected by the acts done by a man.

Good and evil are determined by social factor. The emphasis is placed upon the consequences of one's act in the experience of others.

The social and individual consequences of actions are also emphasized by philosophers of pragmatic school as the criteria of good and evil. This is called pragmatic approach. According to them "the good is that which serves the ends of the group and the individuals in the group. A good act is one which considers the individual as an end in himself and not as a means.⁷⁴ But, by so considering each individual, a pragmatist considers the welfare of the group as a social unit, the ultimate measure of good and evil.

In short, we can observe two fundamental positions. According to some the criteria of good and evil are "thought to be inherent in the nature of the universe". And no one can understand good and evil without understanding the universe and its nature and its creator. To them good and evil are absolute, having been established from the beginning of time, and are applied in all situations and at all times. These criteria are for ever true, never changing, either by reason or revelation.

The other position is that "good and evil are relative terms, and the criteria, are to be discovered by a study of

the particular situation involved. Time and place play a great role in determining the good and evil. This position looks at the consequences of the particular act in terms of the life of society and determines the ethical quality of the act in terms of the good of the whole. Thus these two lines of the thought have been followed throughout the history, that is either good and evil are absolute or relative. But now-a-days the relative attitude is the most pronounced because in the scientific and modern age to find out the absolute standard for good and evil is too difficult. With this gestalt of the problem of evil now we come to the problem of the present study.

In the thesis at hand we propose to present the problem of evil in Christian and Muslim philosophy with special reference to St. Augustine, Imam Ghazali and St. Thomas Aquinas. We have chosen St. Augustine because he is the central figure of Christian thought. St. Augustine was greatly influenced by Platonic and neo-Platonic thought and later on he has deeply impressed the Christian Thought. Even today we find a great imprint of Augustinian thought on Christian philosophy.

Imam Ghazali is the towering personality of Muslim philosophy. On the one hand he examined the main problems raised by his predecessors such as Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ibn Miskewigh and others, and on the other he

deeply influenced the different disciplines of Muslim thought such as pure philosophy, Ethics, philosophy of religion and Sufism. We find the Ghazalian stamp till today. The philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas is the meeting point of both, that of St. Augustine and Imam Ghazali. The problems which were raised by Augustine and Ghazali regarding Evil, we find the elaboration and rationalization of these problems in the philosophy Aquinas.

In making the study of these illustrious personalities we have tried our best, to go through their original sources.

In the end I would like to submit that till today no such comparative study has been made on this problem, therefore, it is my humble attempt in this direction which needs a due attention.

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Section - A

St. Augustine is one of the key figures in the transition from classical antiquity to the middle ages¹ and in the scholastic trend in which faith or revelation is prior, superior and preferable to reason and this is to be used as an instrument to justify revelation as far as it can. He was also a great figure in the sphere of literature, theology and philosophy. This great African Doctor dominated the thought of the western world for a long time. After the Bible it is the writings of St. Augustine which have influenced the christian thought² when we go through his writings we find that the problem of evil has been the central problem of his philosophy.

He lived through nearly eighty years of the social transformation, political upheavels and military disasters that are often referred to as "decline of the Roman Empire". His life also spanned one of the most important phases in the transition from Roman Paganism to Christianity. The old Roman Pagan tradition was by no means dead, although the Roman emperors had been Christians since Constantine's conversion, some forty years before Augustine was born, nevertheless it was during this period that the Roman state

developed Christianity as the official state religion. Medieval Europe began to take shape within the framework of the Roman empire.

Augustine belonged to the world of late Roman antiquity and its cultural and educational system had a decisive and lasting role in shaping his mind. His education following the standard pattern of the time, was almost entirely literary with great stress on rhetoric. Its aim was to enable its recipients to imitate the great literary masterpieces of the past. This is especially true of the philosophy of the period. Its stock of learning was in large part contained in compendia, though works of Cicero were still being widely read and those of the Neo-Platonist thinkers gave inspiration to both pagans and Christians.

In this social, political, philosophican and theological background, Augustine was born in Tega~~sta~~^{sta}, north Africa, in 353 A.D., of a pagan father and Christian mother, Monica who exercised profound influence on her son.

His education began in his native town, Tega~~sta~~^{sta} with the state language Latin and Arithmetic. At the age of eleven his parents sent him to Medura for advance learning of Latin literature and grammar. The pagan atmosphere of

the place and the study of Latin classics expelled him from Christian faith. The effect which Medura exercised on him was wiped away during the four years of ideal stay with the Christian mother and his father who died as a Catholic in 320 A.D.

Then at the age of sixteen he went to Carthage which was a great port and the centre of government activities. The licentious ways of the city corrupted him and removed him from his ideals of Christianity and soon he yielded to the temptation of marriage but he still maintained a brilliant record of his education. Of all the books, he studied there, Hortensious of Cicero exercised the great influence over him and turned his mind to the search of truth.

At this critical juncture he came into contact with Manichians and became the follower of this sect. This sect used to explain the problem of evil through two ultimate principles: (i) Ormuzd (ii) Ahriman, i.e. good principle is responsible for the good and the evil principle for the evil. Because his materialistic young mind had not been so profound at this stage and he could not find a satisfactory solution of the problem of evil in Christianity, therefore he detached himself from Christianity at least intellectually and this was the first phase of his life.

He became a teacher of rhetoric, first in his native city, and later at Milan (384-386 A.D.) and devoted himself to the study of theological and philosophical questions, which carried him from Manichianism to scepticism and which left him dis-satisfied. This was the second phase of his life.

In 380 A.D. he began to read some of the writings of Plato and the Neo-Platonists which gave stability to his thought. At the same time he came under the influence of the eloquent St. Ambrose, Bishop of Milan. Now he was in a position to grasp and appreciate the problem of evil as presented by the monotheistic theory. This was his intellectual conversion and the third phase of his life.

After this third phase he came in contact with the words of St. Paul which absolutely changed his character and this was the fourth phase of his life.

After his conversion in 387 A.D. he returned to Teggast, where, for three years (388-391 A.D.) he passed his life according to monastic rules and was ordained to priesthood. During his bishophood he had to face many opponents. First of all he had to throw himself into anti Donatist struggle. He then, turned his attention to the pelagian.

He devoted his great gifts to the developments and propagation of Catholic doctrines until his death on 28th of August, 430 A.D. when he was receiving the penitential paslam.³

Section - B

A sketch of his life and activity will suffice to make it plain that with a few exceptions Augustine did not compose purely philosophical works in an academic sense. This mingling of theological and philosophical themes may appear old and unmethodical to us today because today there is a clear distinction between the provinces of dogmatic theology and philosophy. But "Augustine did not play two parts, the part of theologian and the part of the philosopher he considers the natural man; he thought rather of man as he is in the concrete fallen and redeemed mankind, man who is able indeed to attain truth but who is constantly solicited⁴ by God's grace in order to appropriate the truth that saves".

He was a student of Cicero. And the reading of Cicero's Hortensius aroused in him a love of philosophy. He says, "I was delighted with that exhortation, so far only, that I was thereby strongly roused and kindled, and inflamed to love and seek and obtain and hold and embrace not this or that sect, but wisdom itself, whatever it were."⁵ The search for wisdom is a leading characteristic of Augustine's thought.

He identifies wisdom with happiness because his philosophy is practical, it is the search for the supreme good of the human soul. All men desire happiness but the supreme object of desire must be a permanent good, because to love what may be lost or can perish results not in happiness but in a state of constant fear and anxiety. Therefore earthly or perishable good should not be the supreme object of our desire but God alone is permanent, changeless and eternal. He alone is the supreme object of desire and the possession of God is the indispensable condition of perfect happiness. To possess God is to possess the highest good, but knowledge of God is a necessary pre-requisite; he, therefore says " I desire to know God and the soul, Nothing more Nothing at all".

Knowledge of the supreme good is an indispensable stage but only a stage in the acquisition of perfect happiness which can only consist in the possession of God. The true philosopher must also be a lover of God, because through love and enlightened by reason a man reaches his final end. To achieve it a man must not only know the end but he should, in a sense, become that end and this can only be brought about by love. In loving God, man becomes like God. Thus there is a perfect blend of intellectualism and mysticism in Augustine's thought. According to him the true philosopher not only seeks to know the eternal

truth, i.e. God, but he loves God and thereby becomes⁶ assimilated to Him.

According to Augustine, "the supreme goal of human conduct is a religious, mystical ideal - the mind's union with God in the vision of God. And such union is not possible in this physical or imperfect world but only in future life. This union is possible through love of God. Love is the supreme virtue, the source of all other virtues. Love of God is self control and temperance as opposed to love of the world. It is, the basis of true love of self and others. Fortitude, justice and wisdom guided by love of God, faith, hope and charity are interdependent and are all essential to conversion. "Without (love) faith profits nothing and in its absence, hope cannot exist -- - - - - there is no love without hope, no hope without love, and⁷ neither love nor hope without faith."

St. Augustine envisaged a two-fold ideal, the highest good or perfection is a transcendent good, which is not possible to realize in the flesh because in the flesh a man remains under the sway of carnal desires. This perfection consists in the love of God, in the absolutely good will. A relative perfection may be reached by the performance of external works.

He further argues that the knowledge and the love of the highest good or God restores to man the power to do good works, the power to turn away from the life of sense to the will emancipated from the flesh. "Love of the good is synonymous with freedom; only the good will is free, some men possess good will, others lack it because good will is a free gift of God."⁸

Predestination implies God's fore knowledge of man's choice but such foreknowledge is in no way prejudicial to man's freedom. Man was free to choose eternal life, he did not choose it; God was knowing that he would not and so he decided before hand whom to save and whom to not. Man, in the person of Adam, had his chance; he abused the privilege; God knew he would abuse it; but man was under no compulsion to do wrong. Nevertheless if a man truly loves God, if he⁹ has the good will, he will be redeemed.

He regards the existence of God as self evident. One of his main arguments for the existence of God anticipates the "Cogito ergo-Sum", i.e., "prior to his knowledge that God exists, man has incontrovertible proof of his own existence." He further argues that the certitude of self knowledge provides three aspects on which the argument can be built. These are, "being, life and knowledge". Of two in

animate objects one presupposes the other. An object such as a stone can exist without the added perfection of life or knowledge but living creature presupposes the fact of "being" and a knowing subject that presupposes both life and being. Knowledge is the highest of these three aspects, since its possession implies the other two. Rational knowledge is superior to sense perception.

Among the truths grasped by human intelligence, there are some that are unique in being eternally and necessarily true. They are not reached by a process of reasoning. Such truths then point the way to the existence of an Eternal Truth, necessary and unchanging, which is God.¹⁰

To him, man is the highest creature in nature. The soul which is immortal simple, immaterial and spiritual substance, entirely distinct in essence from the body. He rejects the doctrine of soul's free existence, but he could not solve the question as to how the soul arose? He hovers between Traducianism and Creationism. He seems at times to favour Traducianism, i.e., souls are generated from the souls of parents, to explain the transition of sin. On the other hand he adopts the theory of Creationism that the soul is infused into the body by a creative act of God.

He further says that, without an internal light soul is blind and the internal light is God who illumines the darkness of our minds. This doctrine is called "Divine Illumination". The human mind is illuminated directly by God; there is no intermediary (Nulla nature interposital). The universal truths with which our thought is concerned are none other than The Divine ideas, and sometime he calls them, forms, species, thoughts and laws.¹¹

The ideas have two fold existence. They exist as exemplars in the Divine mind and they have another mode of being in the world. Mind can see the Divine ideas which permeate them. It intuitively seizes the intelligible realities which underlie the existence of sense experience and it is on account of the intuition of the Divine ideas¹² that our concepts are universal and necessary.

About the creation He says, "In the beginning God made heaven and earth ". By earth physical universe is intended and Heaven means the angelic spirits. God created the earth i.e. a matter which was absolutely "without form and void". But the creation of matter did not precede that of form in order of time but in order of causality. Actually the creation of matter and the forms was simultaneous. The forms are eternal and changeless, therefore, possess a two- fold mode of existences: (1) as the ideas in the Divine Mind and

(ii) as the forms of contingent beings. These two modes of existence are simultaneous.¹³

God's act of creation has a double aspect, i.e. (i) the act of making which consists in giving "being" to things; and (ii) that of perfection, in endowing them with their proper forms. He created the world through the 'word' and impressed upon matter a movement which tending towards Him, is an imitation of that intimate union which exists between the world and the Father.

The creatures also are of two kinds; (i) those created in their definite form in the beginning i.e., the angels, the sky, the stars and the four elements, fire, air, water and earth and the soul of man and (ii) those created in germ, as it were ready for some future process of development that is existing in their seeds (Rationes Causales or seminales). The Rationes seminales are humid akin to water and contain within themselves an active principle of development. Thus, God created every thing simultaneously either in actuality or in their rationes seminales. But he believes in the fixity of species; man begets man and the oak tree produces its kind.¹⁴

Section - Cc

Conception of Evil:

The problem of "Good and Evil" as it has been shown in the introduction is one of those persistent problems that has always agitated every inquisitive mind throughout

the ages of human history. It had agitated the primitive and the medieval minds and still seems to have been agitating the mind of the modern man. Such questions, as what is the measure of good and evil in the world? How can we know whether or not an act is good or evil? Is there in the very nature of the universe a Code of laws which determines good and evil or is good or evil a matter of the relation of an act to other acts; and many others have been asked persistently by the philosophers throughout the history of man's thought. A survey of the thinking men down the ages about these questions pertaining to the problem of evil reveals two fundamental positions. On one hand, measures of good and evil are thought to be fixed and unchangeable i.e. good and evil are absolute. These measures having been established from the beginning of the creation and apply in all situations and all times. The other position is that good and evil are relative terms, and that the measures or the criteria are to be discovered by taking into account the particular situation involved, i.e. good and evil are determined by the requirements of time and place. Between these two extreme positions i.e., the absolute and the relative, are many theories of good and evil, which have tried to follow the course of moderation in their approach. They are, however, simply the different shades of the two fundamental positions. They are at variance only with regard to their points of emphasis. Keeping in view these general observations, we should explain Augustine's conception of Evil.

The problem of evil had been, in fact, a life long preoccupation for Augustine. The significance of this problem first struck his mind in his adolescence when he happened to steal some pears with a gang of youth. Having an inquisitive mind, he was set to think whether he had done so owing to the goodness of the fruits themselves or due to the pleasure of his company only. Ultimately he arrived at the conclusion that he committed theft due to the attraction of evil deed itself. This observation seemed to have made a deep imprint on his mind and he grappled throughout his career, since then, with the problem of evil in the world.

St. Augustine was a theistic philosopher of the scholastic trend of medieval Europe. The dominant factor in his philosophy having the Christian faith is the absolute -ness and all pervading majesty of God. He believed that God is an Eternal and Transcendental Being, All powerful, All-knowing, All good and All-wise. Theistic philosophers desiring to prove the absolute goodness of God having difficulty in explaining the existence of death, suffering, and evil in the universe. They are faced with this seemingly perplexing question as to how can an all-good God create a world in which there is evil. St. Augustine, being adhered to the philosophy of theism had to face the same dilemma, i.e.

If God is all powerful Being, He must be able to prevent evil, and if He is an absolute good, He must not create evil. But evils are, on the contrary, accepted facts in the universe. Therefore, it logically follows that God is not either all powerful or all-good. Thus, to bring a reconciliation between a good God and an evil world was really a challenging problem for Augustine.

To solve this perplexing problem Augustine firstly adopted Manichian's position at Carthage after coming into contact with Cicero's work at the age of eighteen.

Here he found an easy solution of his perplexing problem in its dualistic theory; where good principle is responsible for the good, and evil principle for the evil. At that time it was difficult for his materialistic young mind to conceive the existence free from the material embodiment or to move easily on a level of abstraction. And he was unable to find any satisfactory solution in Christianity in the face of the dilemma.

But after going through the treatises of Neo-Platonism and its postulates concerning the existence and greater reality of that which is non-material, he turned his attention to the nature of the evil in the light of Christianity.

To understand the right position of Augustine's conception of evil we should be clear about the distinction of 'Cosmic' and 'Moral Evil', because he consistently adheres to this distinction.

The theory which he adopted is Neo-Platonic in character, i.e., to him "Evil is the privation of good",¹⁶ He says, "In the universe, even that which is called evil, when it is regulated and put in its own place, only enhances our admiration of the good, for we enjoy and value the good more when we compare it with the evils"¹⁷. For what is that which we call evil but the absence of good? e.g. "In the bodies of animal, disease and wounds mean nothing but the absence of health, for when a cure is effected, that does not mean that the evils which were present i.e., the disease and wounds go away from the body and dwell elsewhere. They altogether cease to exist; for the wound or disease is not a substance but a defect in the fleshy substance - the flesh itself is a substance and, therefore, is something good, of which these evils are accident. Similarly what are called vices in the soul are nothing but the privation of natural good. And when they are cured, they are not transferred elsewhere. When they cease to exist in the healthy soul¹⁸ they cannot exist anywhere else".

Thus he tried to solve the dilemma and to explain the Cosmic and Moral Evil through the conception of the privation of good.

As regards Cosmic evil he explains it through his conception of "Nature".

To understand his conception of nature, we should know his conception of God and the Creation because nature is created by God who is supreme good.

Though the conception of God and Creation have already been explained in section 'a' here it is enough to say that Augustine believes that "God is the source of all existence.¹⁹ Therefore, He is the Creator of all things and because He is all good, therefore the entire Creation is good. As He says, "The highest good than which there is no higher good,²⁰ is God", consequently He is unchangeable good, hence truly eternal and truly immortal. All other good things are only from Him. He further says, "Thou our lord, the true God²¹ who makest not only our souls and bodies but all things". Thus he proves that God is All powerful, All-good and All wise etc. Therefore everything which he creates, by the very fact that He is the source of existence, has a nature which is good. In other words, He cannot, since He is perfect good create any nature that is not intrinsically good".

These natures are not on the equal plane or level of
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 existence. He says, God is able to make good things both great and small, both celestial and terrestrial, both spiritual and corporeal. But because He is also just, He has not put those things that He has made out of nothing on an equality with that which He begot out of Himself. Therefore, no good things whether great or small can exist except from God; but since every nature, so far as it is nature, is good it follows that no nature can exist save from the most high and ^rue God; because all things not in the highest degree good but even related to highest good and again, because all good things, even those of most recent origin which are far from the highest good can have their existence only from the highest good. Therefore every spirit, though subject to change and every corporeal entity is from God; and all this having been made is nature. For every nature is either spirit or body. Unchangeable spirit is God; changeable spirit, having
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 been made is nature, but is better than body.

These natures are not all on the equal plane or level of existence. He admits the hierarchic order and when he examines the universe of space and time he distinguishes between three categories of things. First, those beings which exist; that which 'is', mere bodies in the physical world. Second, that which both 'is' and 'lives', the class which comprises plants and animals and third which 'is'

'lives', and 'knows', i.e. man who shares existence with mere physical bodies, existence and life with plants and animals but who alone of created things, by virtue of his²⁴ reason is capable of knowledge.

And among things that have life, the sentient are higher than those which have no sensation as animals are ranked above trees. And among the sentient the intelligents are above those who have no intelligence, for example human being is higher than animal.

And among the intelligents, the immortals such as the angels are above the mortals, i.e., men. These are the gradations according to the orders of nature, but 'according to utility each man finds in things various standards²⁵ of value'. St. Augustine attributes to the infinite wisdom of God, who desired to create the universe in a majestic harmony in which things more valuable and important could not exist if they could not be compared with the less valuable. In short, he recognizes 'three planes of being (i) Body', (ii) 'Soul' and (iii) 'God'. As soul controls body, so does God control the soul to which He is in closest²⁶ proximity'.

St. Augustine's doctrine of 'Nature' has an important implication on the problem which in modern philosophy is called the fact-value relation. If a nature has its

existence, i.e., its factuality, from a creative act of God and if at the same time its goodness or value is derived from the same source of creation, it becomes quite impossible to contemplate a nature without considering simultaneously its existence and goodness.²⁷ Augustine's attitude towards the relation of 'fact' and 'value' appears also when he considers the highest level of reality, i.e. God. As he says, "But as He is a substance together with the Father and Son, so that substance is together with them great, and together with them good and together with them holy and whatsoever else is said in reference to substance, since it is not one thing to God to be and another to be great or to be good and the rest."²⁸

Secondly, he says that 'nature is another name of three things viz. measure, form and order. In his words, "Spiritual, corporeal, every measure, every form; every order, both great and small are from the lord or God. These three things where they are great, are great good; where they are small, are small good; where they are absent, there is no good; where they are great, these are great natures, where they are small, these are small nature, where they are absent, there is no nature; therefore, all nature is good'.²⁹ Thus it can be said that every nature so far as it is nature is good. Therefore, every spirit, though subject to change and every corporeal entity is from God and all this having been made is nature.

In short, every thing which exists has a nature and nature is created by God; therefore, everything is good though there is a gradation in goodness but nothing is evil in its being. But "In all these things whatever are small are called by contrary names in comparison with greater things; e.g., as in the form of a man, because the beauty is greater, the beauty of the ape in comparison with it is called deformity. And the imprudents are deceived as if the former is good and the latter is evil".³⁰

Now it is proved that nature is good, because it is created by Supreme Good. Then "Where is evil"? Augustine says, "Evil, which is nothing else then corruption, either of the measure, or the form, or of the order, that belongs to nature³¹5. Because they are less than they should be or because they are not adapted to those things to which they should be adapted, (1)"as if anyone should be said not to have done in a good measure because he has done less than he ought; (2) likewise a form is called bad either in comparison with something more handsome or more beautiful, this form being less in comeliness or it is out of harmony with the thing to which it is compared. Similarly order is called bad when order itself is maintained in an inferior degree. Hence disorder is bad. Thus if there is any form, order and measure there is some good and some nature. Though it may be corrupted if anyone of them is less than it should be. But even when corrupt, so far as it is nature,

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it is good and so far as it is corrupted it is evil. In other words, an evil nature is one in which measure, form and order is vitiated and it is only evil, in exact proportion to the degree in which they are vitiated; if the nature is not vitiated it would be all order, form and measure, i.e. it would be good even when vitiated, as nature it is still good and evil only in so far as it is vitiated. Thus nothing evil exists in itself but only as an evil aspect of some actual entity.

Thus it follows that there can be evil as long as there is some good; if there is no good at all there can be no evil. As Augustine says, "So long as a being is in process of corruption, there is in it some good of which it is being deprived of. If a part of the being should remain which can not be corrupted this will certainly be an incorruptible being and accordingly, the process of corruption will result in the manifestation of this great good, therefore corruption can consume the good only by consuming the being".

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There can never be entire corruption, because entire corruption of good is the entire consumption of the entity and consequently the entire consumption of the corruption itself because the subsistent corruption will have nothing to dwell in. Thus, corruption cannot consume whole good without consuming itself because, "the good which makes it a being cannot be destroyed without destroying the being itself."

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Thus he justifies that "every being, therefore, is good
 "A great good if it cannot be corrupted, a little good if it
 can".³⁵ This conclusion forbids us to say that a wicked man
 is bad; and it amounts to say that good is bad because in a
 wicked man there is certainly positive existence of good in
 the form of man or being and it can incur the prophetic judge
 ments, "woe unto them that call evil good and good evil. That
 put darkness for light and light for darkness. That put bitter
 for sweet and sweet for bitter."³⁶

In short, we may say that "every actual entity is good"
 (Omnis natura, Bonum est).³⁷

He further says that the corrupted nature of a more
 excellent order is sometime better than inferior nature even
 uncorrupted; as corrupt gold is assuredly better than in-
 corrupt silver and corrupt silver than incorrupt lead etc.
 "So in case of spiritual beings, rational being even corrupt-
 ed through an evil will, is better than an irrational being
 though incorrupt".³⁸ But if corruption takes away all measure,
 all form, all order from corruptible things, no nature will
 remain. And consequently "every nature which cannot be
 corrupted is the highest good and such highest good is God."³⁹
 But every being which can be corrupted has some good.

In the case of good and evil the logical rule that two contraries cannot be predicted at the same time of the same thing does not hold. Because good and evil are contraries but evil springs up from good and cannot exist without good, "For a man or an angel can exist without being wicked; but nothing can be wicked except a man or an angel".⁴⁰ And being a man, he is good and being a wicked he is an evil, thus "two contraries are so far co-existent that if good did not exist in what is evil, neither could evil exist".⁴¹ He, thus, justifies the existence of evil in things that it is not a positive entity, but merely a privation of a positive entity.

Secondly, "God desired to create the universe in a majestic harmony and harmony depends upon the hierarchic ordering of things in creation." In his hierarchic order the things more valuable and important cannot exist if they cannot be compared with the less valuable. "God, therefore, willed every thing for the best interest of His creatures and even so-called evil must be good in its own way".⁴²

Thirdly, he justifies it through aesthetic theme like the shadow in a picture, which contributes to the beauty of the whole. "Evil is indispensable to the goodness of the world"⁴³ as the antithesis for the poem. For what are called antitheses are among the most elegant of the ornament of

speech. The Apostle Paul also makes a graceful use of antithesis in that place where he says, "By the armour of righteousness on the right hand and on the left by honour and dishonour, by evil reports and good reports: as deceivers, and yet true; as unknown and yet well known; as dying and behold, we live: as chastened, and not killed; as sorrowful yet always rejoicing; as poor, yet making 44 many rich; as having nothing, and yet possessing all things". These oppositions of contraries lend beauty to the language; so the beauty of the course of this world is achieved by the opposition of contraries arranged as it were by elocution not of words, but of things. In this way "God has set good 45 against evil and life against death".

In short every thing in the universe is good and beautiful in its own place. No nature at all is evil and this is a name for nothing but the want (absence) of good. But from things earthly to things heavenly, from the visible to invisible, there are some thing better than others; and for this purpose are they unequal in order that they might all exist. Now God is, in such sort, a great worker in great things that He is not less in little thing — for these little things are to be measured not by their own greatness (which does not exist) but by the wisdom of their Designer, as in the visible appearance of a man. If one eyebrow be shaved off, how nearly nothing is taking from the body, but how much from the beauty, for that is not

constituted by bulk but by the proportion and arrangement
 of the members.⁴⁶ Thus he explains the Cosmic evil through
 infinite wisdom and goodness of God who ordains all and
 whose ways are beyond human understanding.

After discussing the Cosmic evil St. Augustine
 explains moral evil.

St. Augustine explains moral evil on the basis of
 human will or freedom of will. He did so by isolating the
 inner fact of the human will and seeing in it the ultimate
 source of moral evil.

Augustine says that It is an admitted fact that God
 has given man free will. It is proved by the commandments
 of holy scripture because there are so many commandments
 which in some way are expressly adapted to the human will,
 for instance, there is "Be not overcome of evil", "Be not
 like horses or mules, which have no understanding", "Despise
 not the chastening of the Lord", "Forget not My law", "For-
 bear not to do good to the poor" and "Devise not evil against
 thy friend", "If I do this willingly, I have reward", "Do
 not speak evil one of another," "Do not love the world" and
 other things of the same import. Now whatever it is said,
 "Do not do this" and "Do not do that" and whenever there
 is any requirement in the Divine admonitions for the work
 of the will to do anything or to refrain from doing any-
 thing, there is a sufficient proof of free will. No man,

therefore, when he sins, can in his heart blame God for it, but every man must impute the fault to himself. Nor does it detract at all from a man's own will when he performs any act in accordance with God. Indeed a work is done and it is to be pronounced a good one, when a person does it willingly, then, the reward of a good work be hoped for from Him concerning whom it is written, "He shall reward every⁴⁷ man accordingly to his work". Nature with free will owes its proper use. If anyone thinks he is forced to sin and thus owes this, that he ought to sin; is an error, for his own nature compels no one to sin⁴⁸ but, it (sin) is a matter of free will.

Thus he states that "evil does not arise from a⁴⁹ substance but from the perversion of the will".

The will is free to turn away from the immutable God and to attach itself to mutable good, taking as its object either the goods of the Soul, without reference to God or of the goods of the body." The will necessarily seeks happiness, satisfaction, and defacto this can be found only in⁵⁰ God, the immutable good." Therefore, "evil is the turning⁵¹ away from the immutable good to mutable good".

The human will is, then, free to turn to God or away from God, but at the same time the human mind must recognize the truth that happiness can be found only in immutable good

or God, and also that the direction of the will to that good is implanted by God and willed by God, who is the Creator; by turning away from God the will runs counter to the divine law, which is expressed in human nature made by God; for himself the will is free, but it is at the same time subject to moral obligations, and to love God is one's duty. Augustine says, "That the only cause of any good that we enjoy is the goodness of God and that the only cause of evil is the falling away from the unchangeable good of a being made of good".

But here a question arises when every created thing which is mutable is good because it is created by Good God, as it is shown, why turning towards that thing becomes evil?

Augustine argues how a man should lead a rational life? We all certainly desire to live happily and happiness can be attained through the man's chief good which is loved by him. Man's chief good cannot be anything inferior to man himself but every man is bound to follow what is best. If we find "something which is both, superior to man and can be possessed by the man who loves it, who can doubt that in seeking for happiness man should endeavour to reach that which is more excellent than the being who makes the endeavour." ⁵² In other words we can say that human being is mutable and insufficient to himself, "it can find his happiness only in the possession of what is more than himself, ⁵³ in the possession of an immutable object". But the possession

of the eternal and immutable object i.e. God, for him, is not "purely philosophic and theoretic contemplation of God, but a loving union with and possession of God, of super-⁵⁴natural union with Him".

Secondly, there should be confidence regarding the good, he enjoys. Further he says that Man's chief good is the good of both, body and soul.

Thus the perfection of all our good things and our perfect good is God. We neither come short of this nor go beyond it. And He is the object of love; therefore, He is man's chief good and He cannot be lost against our will. The greatest commandment, therefore, which leads to happy life is "Thou shalt love the lord, thy God with all thy heart, soul and mind"⁵⁵. For to those who love the lord all things, issuing from Him are good. Hence Paul says, "I am persuaded that neither death nor life ----- not things present, not things future shall be able to separate us from the love of God"⁵⁶. Thus, according to Augustine we can "unite to God by love in subjection to Him"⁵⁷.

Now it is clear that why the perversion of the will towards mutable things or good becomes evil. In short we can say that man's desire is to live happily and he can attain this happiness only by chief good and chief good is only God who is immutable, therefore, that happiness which is attained by chief good or God can never be lost, while

on the other hand mutable goods are not eternal, therefore, they can be lost; that's why if a man turns towards such mutable good he loses his eternal happiness which becomes evil for him. Thus, "the principle of morality is love of God and essence of evil is a falling away from God".⁵⁸ The cause of good things is in the Divine goodness whereas the cause of evil is in the created will, which is to turn away from the immutable good.⁵⁹

Now in this case that if man's actions are not always what they should be, his will is responsible because he makes his decision freely and it is in virtue of this freedom that he is capable of doing evil. The question then arises as to How could a perfect God endow us with free choice, i.e. with a will capable of doing evil?⁶⁰ or who was that put this in me? etc. In short, we can ask whence comes this evil will?

If it comes from God, why not God is ultimately the source of this evil?

Augustine simply says that will is good, which does come from God, for without it man would be unable to act rightly because the concept of righteous action would have no meaning. But to be able to act rightly carries with it inevitably, the possibility of acting wrongly.⁶¹ In reality, we can say that in the world of bodies there are many things which we can put to bad use, but this is no reason for saying

that they are evil and that God should not have given them to us, because considered in themselves they are good. As hands are good and useful things but the man who commits criminal and shameful acts with them makes bad use of them. A human body without feet would obviously be very imperfect, but a person who uses his feet to go to wrong places and injure another or to disgrace himself, makes bad use of them and same may be said of the will. "In itself will is good, because without it no one could lead an upright life. It comes to us, therefore, from God and we should find fault with those who use it badly, and not with Him who gives it to us".⁶²

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"Free will is the medium good", its nature is good, but its effect can be good or bad according to the way man uses it, now "the use to be made of free choice is under the control of free choice itself".⁶⁴ It is resistable because if it is not resistable it has been created to function under necessity and in that case the fault would have been on the part of the Creator, which is extremely absurd. "Reason, the source of all knowledge knows itself; memory, the storehouse of all recollections, remembers itself, free will, the master of every thing else - for it is all at its free disposal - is also master of itself. Hence it rests with free will, and free will alone, to put to evil use the good that it is".⁶⁵

On the other hand, the possibility of evil use of free will was the necessary condition for the goodness and happiness brought about by its good use.⁶⁶ When our will clings to that immutable and universal good in order to find its joy in it, it possesses the happy life, which is man's supreme good.

"Turning away from the Sovereign Good, and turning to secondary good: these are, in brief, the two free acts which decide our eternal happiness or misery".⁶⁷

But here a question lies, as to how does it happen that the will chooses sin? God is the cause of every thing. So He is the cause of the act whereby free choice turns away from the supreme good to fasten on lower goods and since that act is unquestionably a sin. God is, therefore, the cause of sin itself, Or if that act does not come from God, where does it come from? "The only honest answer that can be made to this question is that we do not know anything about it, not to be sure, that we do not know where the real responsibility lies, but rather because we cannot know a thing which is nothing". (Sciri Crim non potest quod⁶⁸ nihilest).

Every good comes from God; every nature is certainly good; therefore every nature comes from God. This strict conclusion applies to sensible as well as to intelligible

things. Whenever we see a being in which measure, order and number are to be found let us not hesitate to acknowledge that God is its author. But if we strip that being of the order, measure and number it has, and remove them altogether, absolutely nothing will remain. As long as a rudiment of form remains, however crude and imperfect it may be, there is still a seed of goodness and like a kind of matter it can be brought to its perfection, step by step. If an adumbration of being is a certain good, the complete deprivation of good is by definition equivalent to an utter destruction of being. Consequently, it becomes quite inconsistent to imagine a positive cause like God at origin of the act whereby free will turns away from Him. It is true that He has made the will master of itself and capable of adhering to the sovereign good or of turning away from it, but once so made by God, it was in its power to separate itself from God, it was its duty not to do so.

In similar way he tried to explain the original sin of Adam. "Adam's fault-for that is what it was not the natural and necessary fall as of a falling stone but rather the free fall of a will letting itself go". It was sin to touch the tree not because the tree was bad as "every creature of God is good" and accordingly every tree also which God planted in Paradise is assuredly good. Man did not, therefore, strive after an evil nature when he touched the forbidden tree; but by deserting what was better, he

committed an evil deed. Since the Creator is better than any creature which He has made, His command should not have been deserted, that the thing forbidden, however good, might be touched; since the better having been deserted, the good of the creature was striven for which was touched contrary to the command of the Creator. God did not plant an evil tree in Paradise; but He Himself was better who prohibited its being touched.⁷⁰

Secondly, 'He had made the prohibition in order to show that the nature of rational soul ought not to be in its own power, but in subjection to God, and that it guards the order of its salvation through obedience, corrupting it through disobedience. Hence also He called the tree, the touching of which He forbade, the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil (Gen 118) because when man should have touched it in the face of the prohibition, he would experience the penalty of sin, and so would know the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience.⁷¹

Now the question arises what is the cause of this inverse turning of the will? whether it has an efficient cause or not?

If there is an efficient cause, i.e. if there is anything which is the cause of evil will, it either (1) has or (2) has not a will.

If it has a will it is either (a) good or (b) bad.
 (a) If it has a good will it can never make another will bad because it is good in itself


(b) If it has a bad will, consequently it can make another will bad and thus it will lead us into an infinite regression. So no evil will can be the cause of first evil will.

If it were since eternity it must have been existing in some nature. For if not, then it could not exist at all. If it existed in some nature it must have been injuring it since eternity, otherwise it could not be an evil will. But if it had been injuring since eternity the nature must have been corrupt since the very beginning, which can never be, because every nature at creation is wholly good. Now it is hereby proved that the evil will is not from eternity and anything that has a will cannot be caused.

(2) If it is supposed that any thing is the cause of evil will which has no will, that thing is either

(a) Superior, (b) Equal, or (c) Inferior to it.

(a) If it were superior to it, it must have a will or rather a good will and consequently can never be the cause of evil will.



(b) If that were inferior to it even, then that being⁷² intrinsically good could not make it bad.

So it is the turning of the will from a superior thing to an inferior thing which is contrary to the order of nature and not the inferior thing itself that makes the will evil, just as fault of luxury and avarice is not the beauty and gold but the will (Heart) that loves sensual pleasure, and injustice to the neglect of temperance of justice.

Another example is that 'two men alike in physical and moral constitution see the same corporeal beauty; one yields to the temptation and is excited to have an illicit enjoyment falls away from chastity. While the other steadfastly maintains a modest restraint of his will'.⁷³

Again the question arises when the sight was the same and the seers were identical (in every respect) what made the will of the former to commit evil.

Now one can only think that the will of the former might have turned evil and the will of the latter remained unmoved because each will was made out of nothing and consequently had the capacity of remaining good through resistance or to be defiled by the temptation, the former maintained the resistance and the latter did not.

Thus this evil can have no efficient cause, it itself is a defect, diminishing the good of nature, as it turns from the higher to the lower and so it must have only a deficient cause.

To look for the cause of deficiency or of a lack of being is like looking for a positive cause for silence or darkness. Silence is merely an absence of sound; darkness is simply an absence of light; in the same way we might say that sin in our will is merely an absence of the love for God. Our will is changeable because it was created from nothing and is therefore imperfect and liable to be deficient.

This deficiency is nothing other than privation of good. Will is not like tree because " a good tree cannot bear evil fruits"⁸⁷ (Matt 7:18). But it is like a soil from which both sorts of trees (good and bad) can grow and because the will is the medium (of) good, which can be put into bad use like bodily organs such as hands, eyes etc. Through eyes we can see both good and bad pictures. In this way Augustine tried to explain evil as the privation of good.

A Critical Appraisal

The problem of evil as it is presented by St. Augustine is essentially theological, in nature because St. Augustine's faith rests upon the revelation of the Holy Scriptures and the incarnation of Jesus Christ. Augustine, therefore, always has a scriptural reference ready at hand.

The problem of evil is, for Augustine, a purely optimistic. He believes in the ultimate goodness of the universe. God in his opinion, could have omitted evil altogether from the scheme of things, but He preferred to use it as a means of serving the good; the glory of the universe is enhanced by the presence of evil just as darkness adds the beauty of moon light. In order to have God's goodness along with His omnipotence, Augustine employs several devices of the theological optimists. He ascribes to evil a relative status. He states that (i) evil is necessary to the good as a black spot is to a beauty of a picture, (ii) he defines evil as a privation of the good. It is actually an absence of good, as the blindness is nothing but the absence of sight, (iii) He shifts the responsibility for evil and
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to man, because there is no evil other than moral evil and the source of moral evil is the perversion of free will and free will in itself is good which is created by God. At one time or another he adopted each of these mutually complementary solutions of the problem of evil.

Augustine tries his best to present a theologico-Philosophical solution of the problem of Evil in the light of his Christian faith with the help of scholastic reasoning.

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RTHIRDA L - G H A Z A L I

AL - GHAZALISection - A:B a c k g r o u n d:

Al-Ghazali, the philosopher and the theologian, has been judged by many to be the greatest among Muslims after the Prophet. He is certainly one of the greatest minds in the history of Islamic philosophy and theology and undoubtedly ranks with the greatest thinkers of the world. Long before Descartes, he enunciated the method of doubt as a fruitful process of philosophical enquiry and propounded a theory of causation quite similar to that of Hume. In his general attitude he approaches Kant and Schleiermacher. Prof. D. B. Macdonald in his "Development of Muslim Theology - Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory" pays a glowing tribute to him in these words, "The greatest, certainly the most sympathetic figure in the history of Islam and the only teacher of the after generations ever put by a Muslim on a level with the four great Imams."¹ His life and thought had, infact, played a cardinal role in determining the spiritual values of Islamic Society. In his own person he took up the life of his time with all its problems. He lived through them and drew his philosophical and theological thought or

system from his experience. "Everything that he thought and wrote came with weight and reality of personal experience".

He has been ranked by many as "the equal of Augustine³ in philosophical and theological importance" but unfortunately neither Muslims nor Christians have tried to understand them in a true historical perspective. In our personal undertaking we concern ourselves to make a comparative study of the problem of Evil in Augustine's and Al-Ghazali's system of thought.

Before going into detail of Al-Ghazali's views on problem of Evil, it seems desirable to have a clear understanding of the historical background of his thought, i.e., political, intellectual and the religious conditions of the age in which he lived and influenced the people. For a thinker not only moulds an environment according to his own ideals but he himself happens to be affected by the socio-political - religious conditions of the age. Moreover it will in many ways help us to understand and appreciate the significance of Al-Ghazali's thoughts.

"Before Al-Ghazali and even in his own days the different sects of Islam came to logger heads between themselves and bitter fights were fought. The followers of different sects used to be deadly enemies of the followers of the other, one group could not tolerate the belief of another under any circumstances".⁴

The history shows us how un-islamic elements came to be assimilated by the Muslims. The un-islamic elements which entered the traditions of Islam acted highly injuriously in shaking the religious foundation of the Muslims. Greek philosophy and science intoxicated the later Mutazilites and the philosophers. And the Shias and the Sufis were enamoured by the subtleties. Thus the seeds of disbelief and scepticism were sown through these agencies and inspite of the many efforts made to check the tide of un-islamic tendencies, they continued to work on the minds of the people with great vigour even in the time of Al-Ghazali himself. It became a fashion to pose as a philosopher in order to have an excuse to neglect religion."⁵

Islamic thoughts developed under the impact of Greek philosophy. Muslim philosophy may be divided into four main schools viz. Mutazilism, Asharism, Sufism and the Philosophers (Hu^lma).

The Mutazilites studied the works of Euclid, Pythagoras, Galen and others. In metaphysics they were influenced by Plato and Aristotle. The views of Greek Philosophy came to them in the beginning through translation. According to them the only source of true knowledge is reason but their interpreters gave a religious and mystical colour to their philosophy and the Muslims being religious minded accepted them as such.

The muslim philosophers like Kindi, Farabi, Ibn Sina and others accepted Aristotle as a religious man through the book "The Theology of Aristotle". Plotinus proved that in the opinion of Aristotle human soul is incapable of knowing God through reason; God can be known through ecstasy. Muslims read such mystical views, and through this mystical tendency they tried to harmonize the philosophies of Greek masters with the tenets of the Quran.

These philosophers believe that since God is one, and from one only one proceeds, and many cannot proceed. Therefore God first created the Agent Intellect, who, in turn, created the Second Intellect and first heaven, and the Second Intellect produced the third intellect and second heaven and so on.

About man they believed that man consists of body and soul. Body is material and perishable and divisible while soul is spiritual, immortal and indivisible. The body belongs to this physical world (dhalq)⁷ and soul belongs to transcendental world (Amr). Its yearning for the Agent Intellect is due to this reason.

In their view there is causal connection in the universe and that, the higher affects the lower. They established different grades of creation. They placed God at the top, material elements or bodies at the bottom. Soul was placed in between God and body. Thus soul always makes an effort to be more near and near to God from whom it has emanated.

To attain His nearness, knowledge of God is essential thus knowledge is more important than action. This knowledge comes through the philosophy but all men cannot comprehend the true philosophy because all the individuals are not equally sound. Hence there is need of religion (revelation) for the mass. The goal of religion like that of philosophy is to seek the truth. Therefore in fundamental matters philosophy is in no way different from religion. That is why all Muslim philosophers tried to reconcile philosophy with religion.

Very early the Muslims took the Quran as the only true guide to humanity that promises success in this world and the world to come. But after conquest and the expansion of the Muslim empire, new problems emerged. To solve them rationally they took help from the philosophy and the Greek works were translated into Arabic. In these studies⁸ lie the roots of religious and moral crises in Islam since the philosophers began to interpret Islamic doctrines under the guidance of Greek philosophy and especially neo-Platonism.

According to Mutazilites the problem concerning God and soul can be solved through reason. On the other hand Asharites relied on revelation. On still another side there were sufis who developed their philosophy out of yearning of the human soul for the direct apprehension and nearness of divine Being, i.e. God.

The Mutazilite school has a rationalistic tendency, they believed in the competence of human reason to know the diversities of the universe and to search out the truth.

The orthodox theologians and common people, on the other hand, were of the belief that 'Truth' could only be found through the Prophet. According to them the nature of

good and evil is determined through the commandments of God.⁹
 The orthodox group accepted the Asharite theology against
 heresy and disbelief. The Saljuqs who were orthodox sunnis
 helped the orthodox group. Nizam-al Mulk, the grand-vizier,
 was an Asharite and under his auspices Asharite theology
 flourished. The Asharite defeated the Mutazilites and then
 turned to combat the philosophers.¹⁰

The system presented by Abul Hasan Ashari is known as
 Asharism. He maintained that "theology could not be built
 on a purely rational basis. Faith in the Quran and the
 Hadith (Sunnah of the Prophet) was necessary."¹¹ According
 to him God is the only Creator and man cannot create any-
 thing. God gives man the choice and the power. Then He
 creates actions which correspond to power. Only God can
 initiate and acquisition (Kasab) belongs to man which means
 that his actions already created by God in him, correspond
 to the power and choice. Man is the Locus (Mahal) of his
 action.¹² Man, therefore, is responsible for his deeds -
 good and evil. He further maintains that there is no limita-
 tions on God.

The credit of establishing powerful system of meta-
 physical theology and scientific foundation of scholastic
 Kalam goes to the suitable and original mind of Al-Ashari.

Al-Ashari's propoundings were occupied by the orthodox theologians as a gift or blessing from God.

Then the Saljuqs who ruled over Baghdad and were orthodox Muslims stopped all free thinking in religious matters. The Asharite school of theology was fortunate to claim among its defenders personalities like Baqilani, Imam Harmayn etc. In the last instance its progress was accepted still further by the successors of Tughril Beg. He conquered Baghdad (A.D. 1055) and delivered the Caliph from the Shi'ite control. His successors founded the renowned Madarsa of Nayshabur, in Baghdad to spread Asharite doctrines. This marks the turning point in the Asharite bid for final victory. It was, however, mainly through Al-Ghazali that the Asharite system became the most popular system in the Islamic countries. The Asharite doctrines as modified by him established themselves finally in the whole Islamic world.

As regards Sufism, before Al-Ghazali, it passed through three main stages of development.

At the first stage, Sufis were ascetics and quietists. They laboured under a terrible consciousness of sin. This would seemed to them fleeting and deceitful, keeping man

away from heavenly bliss. They were terribly afraid of the world to come. At the second stage of development which is known as the theosophical stage, they introduced the doctrines of total forgetfulness, emotional elements, Tauhid, Hal (state) and Maqam (stage) and ecstasy. At the third stage Pantheism came to the forefront. Pantheism obliterates the distinction between the Creator and the creature and contends that there is only one existence, all else being a manifestation of that existence.¹³

The breach between Sufism and the orthodox Islam took place gradually. At its first stage of development Sufism was not very different from Islam. In their conduct they cut themselves off from society and devoted on religious exercises, purification of the heart. And at the third stage Pantheistic tendencies became evident but later on there appears a distinction between Sufism and Islam. The external side of Islam was neglected by many so-called sufis and the Shaikh was added to the authority of the Quran and Prophet. But a group of thinkers grew up to reconcile the view of theologians and Sufis, i.e. Shari'at and Tariqat.¹⁴ They pointed out that both were necessary, i.e. Shariat and Haqiqat. These are two aspects of the religion and supplement each other. But the gulf between sufism and Islam still remained wide till Al-Ghazali reconciled the two. He rejected all

sects and systems and adopted the Sufi mode of life.

H i s L i f e :

Al-Ghazali was born at Tus in 450/1058 when he was young his father died. His father's Sufi friend brought him up. He studied Theology, cannon law, science, philosophy, logic and the doctrines and practices of the Sufis. He lived in Sufi atmosphere and passed his later life as a follower of Imam-al-Herman. Through the Imam he stood in the Apostolic succession of Asharite teachers, being the fourth from the Ashari himself. There he remained till the death of Imam in 478. He was appointed as a teacher in 484 in Nizamia Academy at Baghdad and there he was struck by a mysterious disease. His physicians said that his malady was mental and could only be mentally treated. He went to Mecca in 488. "This flight, for it was so in effect of Al-Ghazli, was unintelligible to the theologians of the time".

He was wandering in the labyrinth of his time. Since his youth he had been a sceptical and ambitious student playing with religious influences yet unaffected by them. But the hollowness of his life was ever present with him and pressing upon him. As a result of his scepticism his religious beliefs gave way and left him with the course of the time. At last, the strain became too great and he touched for two months the depths of absolute scepticism. He doubted

the evidence of the senses; he could see plainly that they often deceived, for example, shadows move but man's eyes cannot perceive the movement. He doubted the primary idea of the mind. Can a thing be and not be? "Perhaps he could not tell." When senses can deceive us there is no proof of the validity of mind. May be there is something behind the mind and transcending it. He also doubted revelation ecstasy and life after death etc. Thus he, for two months, became sceptic and the thought no reasoning could help him. He had nothing from which he could begin. But at last he got mercy of God and His light that followed in, and there was no need of reason for it. In this way this grace of God saved Ghazali and he regained the power to think.

At that time the people who gave themselves to the search for the truth might be divided into four groups (1) Scholastic theologians, who were similar to the theologians, of all times and faiths. (2) Ta'limites who held that there should be an infalliable teacher to led man to the truth, (3) Philosophers who based their views on logical and rational proofs, (4) Sufis who maintained that those whom God loves can directly comprehend perceive God loves can directly comprehend and perceive God in ecstasy. Ghazali felt that he could ~~ot~~ go back to the unconscious faith of his childhood. He began with scholastic theology but found

no help there, because there was no common ground on which to meet his problems. They were defecient in the necessary knowledge of the subject, were without a scientific basis and helplessly had to consult some authority. Al-Ghazali studied their thought and methods and concluded that the remedy of ailment was not in scholastic theology.

Automatically, then, he turned to Philosophy. He was aware of the weakness of the theologians of not making a sufficient study of primary ideas and laws of thought. He studied the works of different philosophical schools and almost others to meditating and working over his results. He considered himself to be the first Muslim doctor to understand such a task with the requisite thoroughness and perfection putting particular stress on understanding what is to be refuted. But there is a confusion between his attitude when he was investigating truth and the attitude when he was writing. He divided the philosophers of his time into three classes (1) First, materialists, who did not believe in the Creator but to them world is eternal,(2) Secondly, Deist who accepted the Creator and to them creature is like a machine and "has a certain poise (itidal) in itself which keeps it running, its thought is a part of it's nature and ends with death". They, therefore, did not believe in life after death but accepted God and His attributes. Finally, contrary to the above two, there are

theists whose teachings Ghazali deals with in greater detail. But while expressing his ideas about the propoundings of the theists, his tone is of a partisan rather than a seeker. In the light of his personal experiences he warns others and thus his experiences lead man towards the sense of apology.

To him Aristotle was the final master of the Greek school. He divides the philosophical sciences into six parts viz., mathematics, logic, physics, metaphysics, political economy and ethics. He admits always those truths of mathematics, logic and physics that cannot be rejected.¹⁵

He criticised theist philosophers on the following grounds (1) Firstly, they reject the resurrection of the body and physical punishment but to them there is only spiritual punishment, (2) Secondly, they held that God knows universals only not particulars, (3) Thirdly, they mentioned that the world is eternal i.e. it exists from all eternity, (4) Finally, in his opinion the ethical system of theists rooted in Sufism. In every period there have been saints who segregated themselves from the worldly ties. They are witness to God and it is through their ecstasies that we derive our knowledge of human heart for good and evil. Philosophy therefore gave him a little light. The answers of all the questions do not lie in reason only nor

it can unfold every mystery, yet Al-Ghazali had perhaps learnt a good deal from philosophy. His heightened religious instinct could not be satisfied by anything. Similarly Ta'limites could not provide him a firm stable base because¹⁶ they had nothing except accustomed formulae.

Now before him there was the path of sufism. He took up a careful study of the works of Sufis such as Al-Harith, Muhasibi, Junayd, Shibli and Abu Yazid Bistami which revealed that he could understand Sufism through ecstasy and complete transformation of moral being. He further realized that such an understanding consisted more in feelings than in knowledge.

By this time he had set up three points (1) His firm belief in God, (2) His belief in man's rescue in the life hereafter by detaching from this world and turning towards God, (3) His belief in Heaven and Hell as a great fact. These beliefs infused in him a greater urge of knowing the truth and he completely devoted himself to the matters of the other world. Moreover his search of the tranquillity of soul kept him in a state of spiritual conflict for six months from the middle of 488. Owing to the same urge he abandoned all and wandered far from the Baghdad as a sufi leaving aside everything for the peace of his soul. This period, apart from being a great era, marked an era in the

history of Islam. This flight of Al-Ghazali also marked the end of the reign of mere scholasticism, and the introduction of the element of the mystical life in God the attainment of truth by the soul in direct vision.¹⁷

Further he performed religious exercises of sufis for two years in Syria. Then he went to Jerusalem to the tomb of Abraham al-Hebron, Mecca and Madina and with this his life of strict retirement came to an end.

It was dawned upon him that the path of the sufis is the only true path to know God. Their ethics is unalterable by intelligence, wisdom and science. Their path is God and complete purifying of the heart from all. The secrets are revealed upon them. They receive guidance from angels and Prophets. They shift from the state of ecstasy to the proximity of God.¹⁸

He came back to his native town Tus in the last days of his life and settled down to study and contemplation. There he lived with his disciples in Khanquah or monastery. He died in 1111 A.D. in Tus and was buried there.

Section - B:

M e t a p h y s i c s:

Before describing the conception of evil in Ghazali's system, it will be better to make a brief survey of his metaphysics i.e. God, soul, world and after world.

God: Al-Ghazali closely followed the Quranic conception of God; God is self-sufficing, all powerful, all knowing, all compassing, eternal and the only Reality. He is the Absolute Sustainer, Ruler, Destroyer, Restorer, Recorder Exalter (Al-Rafi), and Honourer (Al-Mu'izz). He is the Withholder (Al-Mani), Deferer (Al-Mu-Akhhir), Advancer (Al-Mukaddin), Contractor (Al-Kabid), Spreader (Al-Basit) etc.

Thus, Al-Ghazali believes in Personal God. For the knowledge of God, he says, knowledge of the self is necessary. He quotes the tradition "He who knows himself knows God" that is by contemplation of His being and attributes, man arrives at some knowledge of God.

Man's relation to God is that of dependence. He needs Allah's forgiveness and patience. Allah is watcher and reckoner over him; but He is also a faithful protector and guide, from Him comes all "sustenance in the widest sense". He does everything directly, hence no angels or intermediaries are needed in the scheme, and all is by His will. He

leadeth astray whom He wills and guideth aright whom He wills". Each one can but hope that God will guide him aright, submit himself to Allah in absolute fear and trust that Allah will not cause him to forget and be of the losers in the fire.

For him, Allah was will. He saw everywhere around him the touch, the working of Allah and man was akin to Allah, specially so far will is concerned. Therefore he passed beyond Tanzih 'Volo ergo Sum' (I will therefore I exist) was the basis of Al-Ghazali's psychology. Allah had breathed into man of his spirit (Sura XV 29; XXXVIII 72). The soul of man therefore is different from anything else in the world; is a Djawahar Ruhani, a spiritual substance created but unshaped, not subject to dimension or locality. From its exile here, it seeks the Divine and therefore our soul yearn back to God. In a tradition too it is recorded, that God created Adam in his own form, therefore there is a relation between the spirit of man and that of God as there is a relation between body and soul. Just as soul rules over the body, so God governs over the universe. As we cannot see soul, in like manners we cannot see God in our waking state in this world.

Al-Ghazali says that it is the guidance and grace of God through which we can have the knowledge of God. He further says that the knowledge of soul and the world also leads us to the knowledge of God.

He further says, "All actions are by the will of Allah; only good actions are by His good pleasures. When God requires anything of a creature, He gives him the ability (Istita'a) thereto; that is the basis of the validity of the imposition of the task

Al-Ghazali discusses in detail the different attributes of God, here for example the attribute of providence is presented; there are different degrees of recognition of God's providence, owing to the different degrees of perception in people disputes must arise in tracing effects to causes. For instance, if a man ceases to take any interest in worldly matters, conceives a distaste for common pleasures and appears sunk in depression, the doctor will say, "this is a case of melancholy and requires such and such a prescription." The astrologer will attribute it to some particular conjunction or opposition of planets. "Thus so far their wisdom reaches", says the Quran, "It does not occur to them that what has really happened in this that the Almighty has a concern for the welfare of that man, and has therefore commanded His servants the planets or the elements to produce such a condition in him that he may turn away from the world to His maker. The doctor, physicist and astrologer are doubtless right each in his particular branch of knowledge but they do not see that illness is, so to speak,

a cord of love by which God draws to Himself the saints concerning whom He has said "I was sick and ye visited Me not". Illness itself is one of those forms of experience^{18A} by which man arrives at the knowledge of God.

From these remarks we may be able to understand the exclamation such as "God is holy", "Praise be to God", "God is great". Greatness of God cannot be compared with the creation; we cannot say that the sun is greater than its own light. It rather means that God's greatness is immeasurable, it transcends our cognitive faculties and we can only form a very dim and imperfect idea of it. Thus "God is great" means that "His greatness far exceeds all our powers of¹⁹ comprehension".

The above writings of Al-Ghazali show that God is beyond our comprehension, we can know Him only through His Agents, signs reflected in the universe.

Soul: The soul of man is essentially different from other creatures. As written in the Quran that "God breathed into man of His spirit" (ruh) (XV 29; XXXVIII 72) or "We will show them our signs in the world and in themselves that the truth may be manifested to them". Soul is a spiritual substance (Djawahar-i ruhani) it is invisible, indivisible, it has no corporeality. It belongs to the spiritual world, not to the physical world. There is some

"spark of the Divine", due to this, it turns towards the primal fire. There is likeness between the soul of man and God, "in essence, quality and action. But man's soul has another attributes also like those of animals, some of Devil, some of angels, some are essential and some are accidental.

The outward shape is called body and the inward entity the heart and soul. The soul is higher than body or we can say that soul is a king and different senses of faculties of the body and passions are its kingdom. The spirit of man rules the body as God rules the world. But sometime lower faculties dominate the higher ones as the animal power on angelic power.

The essence of each creature is to be sought in that which is highest in it and peculiar to it. Thus the horse and the ass are both burden-bearing animals, but the superiority of the horse to the ass consists in its being adopted for use in battle. If it fails in this, it becomes degraded to the rank of burden-bearing animals. Similarly with man the highest faculty in him is reason which fits him for the contemplation of God. If this predominates in him, when he dies he leaves behind him all tendencies to passion and resentment, and becomes capable of association with angels. Reason makes him superior to all. As written in the Quran "To man we have subjected all things in the earth".²¹

"The rational soul in man abounds in marvels, both knowledge and power". Through his five senses, he knows the external world and through his heart he knows unseen world of spirit. "His heart is like a mirror which reflects the unseen world."

He is higher than other creatures due to his reason. So He holds also different ranks among higher creatures viz. man, through his power. Souls differ from common folk in three ways (1) what others only see in dreams, they see in their waking moments (2) while other's through will only affect their own bodies, these, by will power, can move bodies extraneous to themselves, (3) The knowledge which others acquire by laborious learning comes to them by intuition.²²

It is a fact that happiness is necessarily linked with knowledge of God. Therefore "the highest function of soul is the perception of Truth; in this, accordingly, it finds it's special delight".

The real greatness of soul lies in his capacity for eternal progress. If he is subjected by his passions as anger, sorrow, sex and bodily needs he becomes weakest among creatures and loses His grace. But if he develops his angelic powers, he raises himself from the rank of beast to that of angel.

World: Al-Ghazali's world was framed on what is commonly called the Platonic system. (1) the heaven and earth, according to Ghazali are the works of God. God created them out of nothing by His will and commands and guides them through His will. He says "Be" and it is. Every created thing is produced directly by him. Al-Ghazali classified existence into three modes (2) (1) Alam-al Mulk, (2) Alam-al Jabarut, (3) Alam-al Malakut. "The first exists by the power (qudrat) of God - One part proceeding from another in constant change; this is physical world or the world of senses. (2) Second exists by God's eternal decree, without development, remaining in one state without addition or diminution. The third, Alam-al Malakut, comes between these two, it seems externally to belong to the first but in respect of God which is from all eternity (al-qudra al-azaliya), it is included in the second. The soul belongs to the Alam-al Malakut, is taken from it and returns to it. In sleep and in ecstasy, even in this world, it can come into contact with the world from which it is derived". These three worlds are not separate in time and space but they stand in close kinship to one another.

This world provides us a knowledge of God's work and through it man gets knowledge of God. Man lives in this world with his senses and when they depart, he lives in the next world with his essential attribute.

Man requires two things in this world viz. the protection and nurture of his soul and (2) of his body. The knowledge and love of God are the proper nourishment of the soul while food, clothing and dwelling place are very simple needs of man's body. Just as a pilgrim on his way to Mecca takes care of his camel, but if the pilgrim spends his whole time in feeding and adorning his camel, the Carvan will leave him behind, and he will be perished in the desert. In like manner a man has to take care for knowledge and love of God instead of taking care only of his body.

We should know the deceitful character of the world as it will not always remain but it is slipping away from us moment by moment, like a shadow which seems stationary but is actually always moving. Secondly, "it presents itself under the guise of a radiant but immoral sorceress, pretends to be in love with us, fondles us and then goes off to our enemies, leaving us to die of chagrin and despair. Jesus saw the world revealed in the form of an ugly old hag. He asked whether they had died or been divorced; she said that she had slain them all. "I marvel", he said, "at the fools who see what you have done to others, and still desire you" The Prophet has said that on the Judgment Day the world will appear in the form of hideous witch with green eyes and
²⁴
projecting teeth".

They, who will seriously contemplate the past during which the world was not in existence and the future during which it will not be in existence, will see that it is like a journey in which the stages are represented by years, months, days and moments. It is not a permanent abode."

World, first appears as mere trifles. Prophet Jassus said, "The lover of the world is like a man drinking sea water; the more he drinks, the more thirsty he gets till at last he perishes with thirst unquenched". The Prophet said, "You can no more mix with the world without being contaminated by it than you can go into water without getting wet".²⁵

Life after death : The conception of heaven and hell, reward for the good action and the punishment for the evil one, are based on the belief in life after death. Al-Ghazali interprets it in the following way.

Al-Ghazali says, man has two souls, animal soul and a spiritual soul. Death is for animal soul. Spiritual soul is indivisible, and by it man knows God. When animal soul perishes spiritual soul still remains. "Death, according to the Prophet, "is a welcome gift of God to the believer".²⁶

Human soul is quite distinct from body. It persists with its essential attributes, which is independent of the body, such as the knowledge and love of God. Therefore, the Quran says, "He who is blind in this life, will be blind in the next life, and astray from the path".

This soul returns to that upper world due to its origin. It was sent down into this lower sphere against its will to acquire knowledge and experience as written in the Quran "Go down from hence, all of you; there will come to you instruction from Me, and they who obey the instruction need not fear, neither shall they be grieved". Every sinner thus carries with him into the world beyond death the instrument of his own punishment. The Quran says, "Verily you shall see hell; you shall see it with the eye of certainty" and "hell surrounds the unbelievers". It does not say "will surround them", for it is round them even now".²⁷

Al-Ghazali has established on Islamic principles that the Summan Bonum, the complete or the ultimate end of a man's endeavours in this world is the vision of God which will become possible in the life hereafter..... According to him the perfect and direct knowledge of God which will constitute the highest bliss is the nature of the vision of God.

"In this world the believer has the conceptual knowledge of God. He cannot perceive Him directly. In the next worlds the direct knowledge of God will become possible. It will not be only direct but also perfect". God can be conceived only in this world. Therefore the knowledge of this world is not complete or perfect.

The vision of God gives the pleasure without pain, wealth without poverty, perfection without defect, joy without sorrow, glory without disgrace and knowledge without ignorance.

For the vision of God, the knowledge of God and love of God are essential conditions. The direct, immediate and complete knowledge of God is not possible in this world but it is only possible in the next world. Only conceptual knowledge of God is possible in this world. This knowledge leads to the vision of God and will reach its culmination in the vision of God in the next life. Man will rise after death with the same faculties and ideals which he had when he died. "The perfection of vision will be in direct proportion to the comprehensiveness of his knowledge. God is one but different persons will see Him differently because of their knowledge being different." No one will be without some knowledge of God, "no heart will pass on absolutely pure. It will be purged by God by punishment or grace before it becomes worthy of the vision of God."

According to Al-Ghazali deeds of men will be examined and evaluated in the next world and the places in heaven and hell will be allotted accordingly. There will be different grades of heaven and hell for man.

He divides men with respect to their spiritual grades in Hell and Heaven into four main classes viz., the doomed (Halikun), the re-deemed (muadhabun), the saved (najun) and the meritorious (faizun).²⁹ These grades are further divisible into various grades. The most exalted in rank among this group will be privileged to see God face to face.

Knowledge, love and the vision of God are relative in the sense that no one can achieve a perfection in them. Every man possesses them to a degree. Therefore, their will always remain in him a yearning for God even after He has revealed Himself to him in the next world. His vision will give satisfaction and joy, but the yearning to know more of Him will remain; it will bring continued increase of knowledge, will continually produce new satisfaction and new joy.³⁰ This will be bliss indeed."

"Thus man is capable of existing on several distinct planes, from the animal to the angelic, and precisely in this lies his danger i.e. of falling to the very lowest. Neither animals nor angels can change their appointed rank and place. But man may sink to the animal or soar to the

angle, and this is the meaning of his undertaking that "burden" for which the Quran speaks.³¹ With this meta-physical background of Al-Ghazali let us now discuss the conception of evil in the coming section.

Section - C:

C o n c e p t i o n o f E v i l :

Imam Al-Ghazali was a great theologian, a profound philosopher and a highly accomplished Sufi. As a theologian he did not deviate even an inch from the fundamental views of the recognized theologians of his age. He affirmed the arbitrariness of Divine action.... God cannot be unjust in what He does, and cannot be wrong in thought what He decrees. "Fair seeming things are fair through His revelation and foul seeming things foul through His veiling, there are two attributes which persist in past eternity as they existed in pre-eternity"..... So that foul and fair are things whose nature, God has prescribed in pre-eternity. The clinging of heart to God and living a life of absorption in Him was the ideal before Al-Ghazali and also the supreme good for him. Every thing that seemed fair or foul was³² judged by this standard".

Now with the consideration of this conception of ideal or the highest or supreme good, we have to examine the conception of evil in Ghazali's philosophical systems.

Evil may be categorized into four kinds such as metaphysical, physical, natural and moral. But Imam Ghazali discusses mainly the moral evil which he calls as "Shar".

Al-Ghazali, in accordance with the teachings of the Quran, believes that God is omnipotent 'o Him is due the primal origin of every thing. It is He, the Creator who began the process of creation and adds to creation as He pleases.

On the question of Khair (good) and Shar (evil), Al-Ghazali finds himself on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand God is represented as the disposer of every thing.

He is the unmoved mover of the material world and the only efficient causes of all creation. Whatever happens in the heavens or on the earth, happens according to a necessary system and predetermined plan. Not even a leaf can move without His decree. His law is Supreme everywhere. Whom so ever God wishes to guide, He expands His breast to Islam but whomsoever He wishes to lead astray He makes his breast light and straight. And on the other hand, man is shown to be responsible for his actions and for deserving place either in hell or in heaven. This implies complete moral freedom. ³³ Al-Ghazali seeks to reconcile both these tendencies on the basis of analysis of the human mind or human nature, freedom of will, ultimate end, knowledge, causation and grace etc.

H u m a n N a t u r e :

According to Al-Ghazali man has got two forms, "Khalq"³⁴ (The physical form i.e. body) and Khulq (spiritual form). Khulq is the spiritual constitution of man. It is the essence of man which abides in his physical body and controls his organic and physical functioning. From this the actions proceed spontaneously and easily without much deliberation, hesitation and restraint on his part. It involves (1) a possession of action whether good or bad, (b) power over the action i.e. the actions are voluntary, (c) knowledge of the action, and (d) a state of the self which is equally inclined towards good or bad.

The self fulfils the bodily needs^r through the motor³⁵ (Muharrika) and sensory (Mudrinica) powers. All these powers are under the control of the self and they regulate the body. All the bodily organs have been fashioned to obey the self. Thus Al-Ghazali holds that mind has supremacy over matter. Mind is the source of all activities. It is a dynamic force which fashions matter according to its needs. Even the growth of the bodily organs is due to the inward yearning of the soul.

In the self of man, there are six powers, viz., appetite, anger, impulse, apprehension, intellect and will. These basic powers have their origin in certain principles

in the nature of man. Appetite is derived from the beastly (al-Bahimiyya) and anger from the ferocious (as sabiyya). The last mentioned power is distinguished from that which rebels against intellect, i.e., the satanic (ash-shaytaniyya). These six powers can be categorized into four elements of human nature viz., (1) the sage, (2) the pig, (3) the dog, and (4) the devil. The sage in him is the 'Aql', the pig Ash shahwa, the dog is al-Ghadab, the devil is the brute which unites these two animals to rebel against Aql. But the fundamental elements in the inner constitution of man are reason or wisdom (Aql, Hikma), self assertion (Ghadab) and appetition (Shahwa). Individuals partake of these powers in different proportions.

Appetite, anger and apprehension are common to man and animals. The self of man possesses two additional qualities which distinguish him from animals and enable him to attain the spiritual perfection. They are Aql, (intellect) and Irada (will).

Aql and Shayataniyya (Devil) are contrary forces in the human self that work through the Shahwa and Ghadab for construction and destruction respectively. Aql, because of the Divine element in it, fights these forces and tries to control and divert them into right channels so as to make them useful for the self. When Aql has checked the evil tendency and subdued and harmonized the animal forces,

its struggle ceases and the self is enabled to pursue its progress unimpeded towards its goal. It is this state of self which is described by the Quranic phrase as Nafs al-Mutmainna (the tranquil soul). But if these forces instigated by Shaytaniyya, rebel against 'Aql' and overcome it, the evil tendency gets strong and gains complete ascendancy over them; while the Divine element becomes weaker till it is almost completely become dead. When the evil tendency becomes stronger and stronger continually inciting them to gratify themselves even at the expense of the good of the self.³⁷

But the state, when the Divine element is continuously struggling with the human evil tendency, which is denoted by the Quranic expression as Nafs al Lawwama (the admonishing soul), it is the equilibrium between them all that produces results which conduce to the realization of the ideal for instance, if "Shahwa" is controlled and kept in moderation, qualities such as chastity (iffa), tranquillity (Hadw), piety (War'a) etc. follow, if Ghadab is controlled, qualities such as courage (shujaa), generosity (karam) fortitude (sabr) etc. are the out come. Both Ghadab and Shahwa are subordinated to the Divine element, qualities such as knowledge (ilm), wisdom (hikma), faith (yaqin) etc. result. If both Shahwa and Ghadab become predominated, qualities of the Devil such as treachery (makr), deceit

(Du kha), cunningness (hila) etc. result and if Divine element transcends its bounds, qualities such as over lordship (Rububiyya), despotism (istibad-bil-umar khulliha) appropriations or claims to special privilege (takhassus)³⁹ etc. follow.

These elements of the nature of man are subject to the direct influence of forces in the cosmos, and which are created to help or hinder the working of the universe. When the heart operates in the divine direction it receive good ideas which is called "al Taufiq" (Divine aid) but if the heart operates in the opposite direction it receives the impact of the other forces known as al-khidhan, the forsaking. In this way the heart of man is between the pulls of the angelic and satanic influences.⁴⁰

By nature, however, the heart is equally susceptible to both the influences⁴¹. The Divine element is guided by Al-'Aql, i.e. reason and the satanic element is led by Ash-Shahwa i.e. appetite and Al-Ghadab (Self assertion). But if appetite and self assertion permeate into the flesh and blood of man, and it is through them that evil rules and the heart becomes the abode of Satan. But if appetite and hunger are ruled and brought under the subjection of reason, the heart becomes the resting place of angels. The Devil has many gates to enter the heart but the angels have only one, i.e. reason. The avenues of the Devil's

approach to the heart are appetite and self assertion, and their innumerable offshoots, for example, envy, greed, malice etc.⁴²

The mind must be concentrated on God and spiritual things, because "the concentration of the mind on God and spiritual things will greatly promote good ideas and check bad ones". Ideas are naturally and necessarily followed by inclination. Man cannot intervene (but still action are free).

Al-Ghazali further classified actions into three types with reference to human reason and will:

(1) Natural, (2) Intentional, (3) Voluntary.⁴³

(1) Natural Action (Al-fil-al-tabi-i)

The displacement of water is natural action and obviously unaffected by human will.

(2) Intentional Action (Al-fil-al-Irada)

If a drawn sword is moved towards one's head, his hand will be raised in self protection. This is the example of intentional action. Intentional actions are due to the consciousness of the evils to be avoided. They are not blind responses but conscious processes. When a sword is drawn, its perception comes to the mind and the knowledge of the danger to be avoided is aroused at once. This gives rise to volition and the volition causes movement

The natural as well as intentional actions are both involuntary and necessary. The difference between the two is that the intentional action is preceded by perception and knowledge, while in the natural action perception of object is not present.

(3) Voluntary Action (Al-fil-al-Ikhtiyari)

All actions in which an alternative is possible and reason makes a choice, are voluntary actions, for example, committing suicide and most of our actions in our daily practical life. In this respect we can say that things presented to the mind are of two types ⁴⁴ (i) those our introspection or observation pronounces without deliberation as agreeable or disagreeable. No alternative is presented to the mind and (ii) those about which our reason hesitates to pronounce such a judgment. Here an alternative is presented to the mind and it has to make a selection. The example of the first is that of the movement of a needle towards our eyes. Here we know that the averting of the danger is advantageous and therefore we do not hesitate. On account of this knowledge our will is at once formed and our power is roused to act in order to avoid the needle and eye-lids are at once closed. Though this action is happened with intention, yet it was without hesitation and deliberation. Our actions where we have a choice are voluntary actions. In these cases reason hesitates and judgment is withheld until we know whether the action which is to be executed

is agreeable or not and we need to deliberate until the intellect decides in favour of acceptance or rejection.

This, however, is complex process during which the Satanic element in man tries to repel its influence. The inherent strength of the instincts of appetite and self assertion, and tendencies formed by previous acts are factors which often disturb the balance of this conflict but when the intellect decides finally, it is followed by the will to execute the actions. And the action will be executed unless there are any external hinderances in the way, e.g. sometimes the source of this will is to shake
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off this inertia.

In voluntary actions too will is produced by knowledge as it is produced in the first kind of action, Therefore willing or not willing to do anything or knowledge of objects is must or essential.

Knowledge is one of the corner stone of Al-Ghazali's ethical system. Morality and good conduct are not possible without knowledge.

Intellect is found in all men though differing in intensity and scope. Initially intellect is a potentiality for the development of knowledge under conditions of experiences and intuitions. This knowledge has two aspects, viz. formal knowledge and existential knowledge. The former is the knowledge of the form in which the various objects of experience and intuition

are apprehended. It is the knowledge of self evident principles.

(1) Existential knowledge is the knowledge of the objects and events given in experience and intuition. It is of two kinds viz., phenomenal and spiritual. The knowledge of spiritual realities, e.g., God, soul etc. is the highest form of knowledge. This knowledge depends upon intuition (Mukashafa) but it comes differently to different people. To some it comes through a good deal of self cultivation (Mujahida) while to few it is revealed directly.⁴⁶

Formal knowledge is innate and existential knowledge is acquired but both occur together. The highest development culminates in the knowledge of the spiritual realities.

Theoretically there is no limit to the possibilities of the development of intellect and knowledge.⁴⁷

Knowledge serves a two-fold purpose.⁴⁸ It is, firstly, an apprehension of objects and their significance; and secondly, a guide to conduct. Accordingly, intellect or reason is considered to have two aspects viz., theoretical and practical.

(1) Theoretical:- It goes from the concrete to the abstract, from the particular to general, from the diversity to the unity, embracing wider and still wider fields under one principle as it advances. It too takes up towards the

transcendental world and receives knowledge from it such as knowledge of God, His attributes, His actions, His angels, the mysteries of creation etc. Intuition is nothing but theoretical reason working at a higher plane.

(ii) Practical reason (al-Aql-amli) is the hand made of theoretical reason. It receives from theoretical reason its ennobling influence. But its active function lies in the domain of human conduct. It gives direction to voluntary individual acts. An individual act of a saint or a patriot or an artist is guided by ideals conceived by theoretical reason, which influences the practical reason in most of its decision in individual act. Moreover, in opposition to reason which works for construction there is in the self a satanic element which works for destruction. Therefore, it is essential that all human faculties should remain under the absolute sway of practical reason, for when it loses its supremacy over them, there follows the wreck of human character.⁴⁹

Sciences are of two kinds, Shariyya (religious) and Aqliya (intellectual). These are the means to the purification of the self, which is further a means to the realization of the ultimate end. The individuals begin to see in their laws not only the commands of God but also the true ways to the attainment of eternal happiness which become fard "ayan".⁵⁰

Ilm-al-Muamala includes the knowledge of Ibadat (man's relation to God), adat (man's relation to man) and the knowledge of good and bad qualities of the soul. In reality the knowledge of these qualities alone is fardayan. The knowledge of these qualities is necessary to lead one to the ultimate goal. This knowledge alone is ilm-al-Muamala. It is the science of the various good qualities of the self like patience (Sabr), thankfulness (Shukr), fear (Khawf), hope (Raja), and abstension (Zuhd) etc.

Ilm-al-Mukashafa is the end and the culmination of ilm-al-Muamala. It is the highest end of man in this world.

E N D :

All human activities are directed to some end. Philosophers and divines in all times and all ages have been striving their utmost to discover and determine some such end in order to realize the greatest happiness and complete satisfaction. This cherished end must be ultimate, beyond which nothing may be desired. This end should define orientate the quality and character of man's behaviour endeavouring to attain it.

Al-Ghazali calls this end as Sa'adat (blessedness). He uses the term, however, for the end as well as for the means. Al-Ghazali considers the end and the means that lead to it as one entity, for anything which promotes the realization of the ultimate end in any sense becomes part

of the end. "To keep the distinction, he qualifies the ultimate end as Al-Sa'ada, al-Ukhrawiya or as Sa'ada al Haqiqiya.⁵¹ But any means to the attainment of as-Sa'ada al Haqiqiya is itself is Sa'ada".

Al-Ghazali holds that the Sa'ada of everything consists in the realization of perfection to the nature of that particular thing. Food and drink are Sa'ada of the animal nature whereas the apprehending of the essence of things is characteristic to man alone. The perfection peculiar to man consists in his developing the higher faculties and apprehending truths by means of pure reason. Without the aid of sense perception,⁵² these higher faculties never diminish and never impose any painful consequences rather these faculties always serve as fountains of pleasure being useful and beautiful in the highest degree.

As Sa'ada al-Haqiqiya, which is called Summum Bonum by other philosophers, is the realization of the vision of God in the next world. This will consists of seven elements. Life without sorrow, honour without disrespect, and knowledge without ignorance - all these are to be eternal without diminishing. This everlasting bliss, the complete end or ideal will be achieved by one's love of God and demonstrated by one's conduct in this world. But the intensity of love towards God is conditioned by one's knowledge of God. Thus it means that knowledge is the highest Sa'ada, the

supreme end in this world, for it leads to perfect love, when it is sought as an end in itself it is absolutely good".

But the highest Sa'ada, Al-Ghazali writes, "consists in the apprehension of the true nature of intellectual truths free from senseless imagination. He delivers reason from its bondage and begins to study not only the heaven and earth with thought-fulness and deep observation but also his own soul and the wonders created therein and thereby reaches the perfection peculiar to him. He achieves Sa'ada, that is, the achievement of perfection by soul is the highest Sa'ada which is not possible in this world.⁵³

F r e e d o m o f W i l l :

When a man understands the full significance of an object and the desirability of seeking it, an yearning is aroused in him to achieve that object by adopting appropriate means. This yearning is Irada.

Now we have to see whether this Irada can be fulfilled with his will freely or it is determined by other forces. Mutazilites say that man possess power (qudrah) over his action and he is real author of his actions, therefore, his will is free to do or not to do anything. But according to Asharites man has the determined freedom.

Origin of action, they say, is in God but completion of action is in man. They put forward the theory of acquisition (Kasb).

In Ghazali's system we find that to him the process of freedom and determination of will recognized to be beyond man's complete control; but his reason is free to make a decision and his will is to accept the decision of reason as good and to implement the corresponding action. In such a case, man would be free to do what he desires but the complete control of his desire would be beyond his power. Thus Al-Ghazali tries to reconcile between freedom and determinism.

Al-Ghazali bases his argument for the freedom of will on his conception of the world as consisting of three realities, viz., physical (Alam al-Mulk), the mental (Alam al-Jabrut), and the spiritual (Alam al-Malakut).

"The lower is the material world where the absolute necessity of God's will is all in all. Secondly it is the stage of the sensuous and the physical world where the relative sort of freedom is recognized. Lastly comes God who is absolutely free".⁵⁴

Man possesses some degree of free will, therefore, human character is capable of improvement, without this

possibility it would cease to have any meaning and all instructions, exhortation, education and self discipline would be of no purpose at all. Though he admits also the limits beyond which human efforts cannot change one's character, for instance, man only regulates and disciplines his passions but cannot root them out, nor, of course, it is desirable that he should do so, for without them life would be not only imperfect but also impossible.

Al-Ghazali discusses the nature of character under
⁵⁵
 three heads:

(1) That which is wholly evil, it is overpowered by passions and obeys their dictates gladly. The light of reason is almost shut to it. It makes no distinction between higher and lower self, for the lower self has become the ideal to it. This attitude of human soul is designated by the Quran as *an-Nafs al Ammarah*, the insinuating self.

(2) "That which is unsettled and wavering in making the choice between good and evil and is constantly subject to an inner struggle on this account. It is capable of doing both good and evil. It feels the clear distinction between the lower and higher self, but finds itself totally unable to cope with the powerful impulses of the baser self which bursts forth occasionally. This attitude is named by the Quran as *Nafs-al Lawwama* (the reproaching self)".

(3) The fixedly good and illumined consciousness. It has received the light and therefore always acts according to the dictates of reason. This is the stage where the distinction between the two selves vapours away for the higher which is the true self and has now become the master. This freedom is not absolute, yet it is of paramount importance, for it is sufficient to affect the necessary change in human character.⁵⁶

Thus the above different characters prove that there is freedom in action to man because through this freedom of will man can change his character. The responsibility of man for his action is stressed by the Quran in unequivocal terms, for instance, "Every soul is pledged for its own deeds. Lo, Allah is swift at reckoning."⁵⁷

Nowhere in the Quran has the responsibility for human action been attributed to God. Secondly, whenever the responsibility for any undesirable act has been ascribed to God by way of inference from his omnipotence and omniscience, the Quran has denied the validity of this inference and has condemned it as a product of sheer ignorance and fancy. "They, who are idolators will say : Had Allah willed, we had not ascribed (unto Him) partner, neither had our father nor had we forbidden ought".⁵⁸

Now if man is responsible for his acts, he must have full freedom of willing and doing those acts. Thus it shows that man has freedom of will.

But the dilemma comes when man can make or mar himself he is free to choose; while on the other hand "God stands as the Disposer of everything. Nothing happens without His will. Whom He wills, He guides aright and whom He wills He leads astray, He wishes and decides what He chooses. All that happens in heaven and earth are from Him." To understand this apparently double tendency with regard to the freedom and determinism of will or in other words the responsibility of action attributed to God and man simultaneously, we we have to turn to another aspect of this problem viz., the theory of causation.

Al-Ghazali, like Hume, seven hundred years before, holds the sequence theory and rejects the efficiency theory of causation. Al-Ghazali denies that "a thing can produce
59 anything". There is no power in the cause to produce the effect. There is no causal connection between things, they are not connected but conjoined. We see one thing preceding the other over and over again and through habit begin to think that they are connected. There is nothing as a cause which produces effect. The only fact is that antecedents have consequents.

God alone is the efficient cause but the ignorant have misunderstood and misapplied the word power.⁶⁰

As to the orderly succession let it to be understood that the two events are conjoined like relation between the condition and the conditioned. Now certain conditions are very apparent and can be known easily even by man of little understanding. But there are conditions which are understood only by those who see through light of intuition.

There is divine purpose linking the antecedents to the consequents and manifesting itself in the existing orderly succession of events without least breach or irregularity.⁶¹ We cannot say that life has been caused by the body though body is the condition of life. In the same way we must imagine the orderly succession of events in the universe.

"Verily, says the Quran, "We did not create the heavens and the earth and what is between them in sport; we did not create them but with truth. But most of them do not know".⁶²

God created life, knowledge, will and action and, on the other, He created an order (a system) as external to these things. These items must conform to the order which is external to them yet imposed upon them, this order of

sucession is obligatory and necessary and it is the result of Divine planning (al-hikmat al-azaliya).⁶³

Al-Ghazali, as we have seen, denies cause in the sense of power of efficient forces when applied to things other than God. The efficient cause is only one. According to him there is only one eternal power which is the cause of all created things and that is God.

From one point of view man himself is the author of his action, from another it is God. On the one hand we see that "the relation of man's action to his power and will is like the connection of the conditioned with the condition. And on the other we observe that the relation of man's actions to the Divine powers is like the connection of the effect with its cause. But by common usage anything which is visibly connected with power, though it be only the abode or channel (Mahal) power, is regarded as "Cause". God as a creative power is the real cause of man's action but man is the apparent cause of actions for it is through him that the manifestation of uniform succession of events takes place. One who attributes all his actions to God has found the truth and has reached the real source.⁶⁴

That we have the apparent paradox that man is determined in his freedom.⁶⁵ The Asharites use for this kind of determined freedom the word "Kasb".

When fire burns, it burns out of necessity (jabr); it is completely determined. God, on the contrary, is wholly free. Man's position lies midway between these two. He is not determined as fire, nor as free as God. "Kasb" (acquisition) is neither against freedom nor against determinism. For those who have insight, it is the sum of these two. "God's action is Ikhtiar, but that of man is not like that of God, because man's will is formed after hesitation and deliberation which is impossible in the case of God. Deliberation is due to lack of knowledge. God's knowledge is perfect. He needs no deliberation "for His Ikhtiar, i.e. choice. Its (finite mind) freedom will be neither complete agreement with the ideal of goodness but it will exclude subordination to the forces beyond itself and it will give opportunity for choosing and serving the good".⁶⁶

The word cause is used in the Quran in different senses. "The angel of death who is given charge of you shall cause you to die; then to your lord you shall be brought back. All take their souls when they die" Have you considered what you saw. "So you did not slay them; it was Allah who slew them and thou didst not smite when thou didst smite

but it was Allah who smote that. He might confer upon the believers a good gift from Himself. Whatever good befalleth thee (O, man) it is from Allah and whatever of ill befalleth thee it is from thyself".⁶⁶

Negation affirms God as the real and efficient cause. Affirmation establishes man's free will faithfully executing divine order.

The above verses show that the word 'Cause' signifies creative power and must be applied to God alone. But man's power is the image of God's power to him. The word has been applied only in its secondary sense. God is alone the real efficient cause and the word must be applied to Him in its root sense, i.e. power. The existence of all other things depends upon Him. Everything is in His grip. He is the eternal and the everlasting. He is the manifest and the hidden. He is the first and the last. He is the eternal and first as compared with all created things. They have emanated from Him. One after another is an orderly succession. He is the last from the view point of the speaker.⁶⁷

In the spiritual progress of man He is the last stage to be reached. So He is the first in existence and the last in experience.

All activity mental or material begins and terminates in Him, who is the first cause, the mover and fashioner of

the universe.

Therefore, those acts are good which ultimately terminate in the first cause or the mover of the universe, i.e. God, which is the ultimate end of man. If the actions terminate in things other than God or against the wish of God, they become evil.

According to Al-Ghazali, evils are the unethical aspects of the natural propensities of man. "The love of this world is the root of all the evils."⁶⁸ If the self is to attain its perfections, these propensities must obey the dictates of reason. But it often happens that they disobey reason and transgress their proper limit and bring the self to humiliation and gradual decay. It is this transgression which takes the shape and colour of so many evils. Evils, then are the wrong development of human propensities which act as veils between man and his goal. For example, when knowledge or reason is rightly developed and becomes perfect, it is wisdom.⁶⁹ It has two parts. First part viz., theoretical, is directed to higher regions. It can distinguish the true from the false in judgment, the right from the wrong in tenets and good from evil in action.⁷⁰ It is the knowledge of abstract and universal truth which holds good for all times, i.e. the knowledge of God."

The second part viz., practical, is directed to lower regions. It controls appetitions, self assertions and

their numerous offshoots and helps to form all personal and social virtues.

But when this wisdom develops wrongly, it manifests the evils of Daba (craftiness), Humq (stupidity) and junun (mania) etc.⁷¹

Daba (craftiness) lies in selecting means which are not straight forward, and are apparently but not actually good for realizing one's motive. A low and unfair motive is Jarbaza (deceitfulness).

Humq (stupidity) is to adopt the wrong method for the realization of ends and junun (mania) is the derangement of the power of imagination. A majunun is ever in for a preposterous end, wandering away from what is natural and reasonable. Humq consists in committing choice of errors in the choice of means, but junun is mistaken about the end itself.

When self assertion is rightly developed it begets following virtues.⁷²

Kibr-al Nafs (self respect) is the mean between pride and self abasement. It helps man to understand the right valuation of events.

Ihtimal (endurance) is the mean between rashness and cowardice. It means remaining calm in difficult and painful circumstances.

Hilm (forbearance) is the mean between cruel and heartless revenge on the one hand and lack of self respect on the other. It makes a man dignified.

Thabat (firmness) is to be stout of heart and unflinching in courage.

Shahama (gravity) is to devote oneself eagerly and constantly to good acts for the realization of goodness and beauty.

Wagar (weightiness) is the mean between pride and humility. It is to bear oneself with propriety and good demeanour.

But self assertion, if developed in excess of reason and appetite, becomes rashness (tahawawur) and is manifested in the following evils.

Badhakha (lavishness) is to spend on vanities, like self-adornment, etc. for ostentation, self glorification, or boasting.

Badhala (meanness) is not to have the heart to spend money even when it is one's moral duty to do so and yet to boast of one's large heartedness.

Sighr-al Nafs (self abasement) is to have no confidence in one-self and to think one-self inferior and unworthy of self assertion.

Infirak (shamelessness) is to love all self respect and remain unmoved even at the grossest insult.

When appetite is rightly developed and in right relationship with reason and courage,⁷³ it is iffah (chastity or temperance) which begets virtues such as (i) Haya (Modesty), and Khajal (shyness) are the mean between licentiousness and prudery. Some hold that it is a feeling of humility aroused by consciousness of his inferiority. When a person meets another superior to him, this consciousness acts as a protection for the soul and helps one to avoid evil.

(ii) Musamaha (forgiveness) is to forego certain rights willingly in favour of others. It is the means between complete renunciation and over insistence on one's rights.

(iii) Sabr (patience) is the struggle of the self against passions and appetite, and keeping oneself away from low and unlawful pleasures, (iv) Sakha, (v) Husn-at-taqdir (ability for good estimation), (vi) Inbisat (cheerfulness), (vii) Damatha (gentleness of disposition), (viii) Husn al-Haiyat (pleasing appearance), (ix) Wara (piety), (x) Zarf (gracefulness and wit), and (xi) Musada (helping others) etc.

(b) But if this appetite is developed in excess of reason and self assertion, the following evils are produced.

Wagaha (shamelessness) is to indulge in vice shamelessly and without fear of disgrace or dishonour.

Riya (hypocrisy) is to hanker after securing the praise and respect of people, although one may not deserve them.

Shakasa (barbarity) is to be remorseful and sullen with men and behave with them in a repulsive manner.

Hasad (envy) is to feel unhappy at the success and happiness of deserving people and to desire their downfall etc.

(c) The deficiency of appetite produces these evils:

Takhannuth (effeminacy) is to feel an excess of shyness so that one is constrained and cannot talk and act freely.

Hatka (disgracefulness) is to indulge in vice and not care to elevate one's self with virtue.

Shamatah (wicked glee at another's misfortune) is to feel happy over the failures and difficulties of people to blame them for their fault etc.

To keep the golden mean between knowledge, appetite and self assertion and to maintain between them right proportions the most needed thing is justice. Justice requires that one should fulfil one's duties. Everything

should be placed in its proper place, i.e., inhabitants divided into grades or classes each with definite duties assigned to it.

Thus the four cardinal virtues, according to Al-Ghazali, are wisdom, Courage, temperance and justice. Al-Ghazali followed Plato closely and has pointed out that in all voluntary actions it is the function of reason to direct to hold the balance between appetite and self assertion and keep them under its sway.⁷⁵

Besides these evils there are many other evils related to the body and the world.

Man has been endowed with the sexual instinct for the propagation and preservation of his race, but the excess love of the wife may distract him from God. "The lustful glance is the root of the evil."⁷⁶

The other is Pride, "It is subjective and objective". The subjective pride is a habit of the self, and the objective pride is the action resulting from this habit. There are two evils of pride, the refusal to accept truth and the contempt of fellowship. The worst pride is that which does not allow one to acquire knowledge and accept the truth. There are three causes of pride. One is in the man who is proud, the other is in the attitude towards the person in relation to whom one is proud. The third is related to some

third object outside the other two, the cause which is in the proud man is vanity or self-admiration. When one admires oneself on account of knowledge etc., one regards oneself superior to others. The cause which is in the person in relation to whom one is proud is rancour and envy. The cause which is outside these two is hypocrisy. So in fact there are four causes such as vanity, rancour, envy and hypocrisy. "Humanity is the mean between pride and dishonour. God loves moderation in action."

Evil of this world are many but the greatest of them is the love of Wealth, love of honour etc. This love is often accompanied with suffering and misery. Wealth and "Jah" are desirable only as means and not as an end.

One must understand one's end on this earth and realize that the true salvation lies not in this world but in the next world in the love of God.

Love of God: But what is the essence of love and what are its causes and conditions?, especially what is the meaning of the love of the creature for Allah? Love is natural turning to an object which gives pleasure. It springs from perceptions and varies with them being either from sense perception whose seat is in the heart. The pleasure through it is the most complete and absolute.

A man loves by nature first himself for the continuance and perfection of his self. Then he loves another than himself because that other serves the same purpose and benefits him. Thirdly, he loves a thing for its own sake not for any happiness that it brings, but the thing itself is his happiness like the love of beauty simply for itself. So if it stands fast that Allah is beautiful He must certainly be loved by him. To him His beauty is revealed. Beauty of mental and moral qualities can be loved. But lastly there is often a secret relationship of souls between the lovers and the beloved and it suffices. It follows, in the absolute sense, there is Allah only.⁷⁷

Al-Ghazali explains how God holds all the causes that inspire man to love. Therefore, He alone is worthy of love. Who love objects other than God do not have the real knowledge of God. The real knowledge of God is the source of the love of God.

Since man loves the self he must love God who is his Creator and also the Creator of what he desires in the matter of his preservation and perfection. Man cannot achieve anything without His grace and blessing.

Man cannot take a single step without the help of God. He is guided by spiritual forces. These forces influence man through his reason. The influence, conditions, circumstances etc., which help man to walk in the path of

Allah, are called tawfiq, the gift of God. Tawfiq manifests itself in different forms such as (1) Hidaya (the guidance of God). No virtue is possible without Hidaya. This is the source and fountain of all virtues. One may have the desire to do good in order to realize the eternal bliss. But it will be of no avail unless he knows what is good and what is bad. Hidaya points out clearly what to do and what not to do.⁷⁸

"And it may be that you dislike a thing while it is good for you and it may be that you love a thing while it is evil for you, and God knows while you do not know"⁷⁹ and "it may be that you dislike a thing while God has placed abundant good in it"⁸⁰ and "Who is more erring than they who follow their desires without any guidance from God".⁸¹

Hidaya has three stages: the first stage is attained when the distinction between good and evil becomes clear. And we pointed out to him two distinct paths.⁸² "To some this distinction is much clear by means of reason and to some it comes through the Prophet and "certainly the guidance has come to them from their Lord".⁸³ If one does not follow it, it is one's own fault, the pursuit of appetites and passions blinds a man from seeking to the right path. The second stage is achieved when man is continually helped by God. This is achieved by hard work in the way of Allah, by good conduct, piety and knowledge. "And those who follow

the right directions, He shall increase them in guidance and give them piety.⁸⁴ The third stage of guidance is that of Prophethood. This is the highest stage when the meanings of spiritual truths become clear as a day. This is the absolute guidance.

(2) *Rushd* (the direction) is that blessing of God (*Canaya-al-Haqiqiya*) which helps man to realize his end. If the end is good it strengthens him according to his capacities, if the end is bad it weakens him. This help or desertion is from within. For action, *Rushd* is more important than *Hidaya*.

Tasdid (the setting aright) is a guidance which makes the body obey the will in order to realize the end. *Tasdid* makes internal and external circumstance accord with the will, to help man in his acts internally through his insight and externally by providing suitable conditions wherein he may achieve the desired end with the means at his disposal.⁸⁵ "When I strengthened thee with the Holy spirit" indicates that there alights something from God in the heart of man, which urges him to do good and abstain from evil. There is something inside the man which checks him without being felt.

The special grace of God shall come to him in due course of time and he will attain the highest felicity

of the knowledge of God through Ilm-al-Mukashfa more or less according to his capacity and merit, for God is just and merciful. Let man do his part and rest content that God will do His. The question of Grace in the Philosophy of Al-Ghazali is irrevocably bound up with human efforts. Nothing however trifling can be acquired without human volition. God favours those who endeavour in His way.⁸⁶"

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FOURTH

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

Section A

St. Thomas Aquinas was a theist. He occupied a distinguished position in the history of Christian philosophy and religion in the middle ages. He was firmly convinced of the truth of revealed religion. He was sincere in his belief that the teaching of the Church is in accordance with reason and although, at times, some revealed truths may be supra reason, but they are never contradictory to reason.

This great philosopher and Theologian was born in 1225 A.D. in Italy. In 1244 A.D., at the age of nineteen years, he received the degree of Master in Philosophy from Naples University. Though his parents did not like to give him a religious education yet he, according to his own choice, studied Dominican courses in philosophy and theology.

In 1252 A.D. he started teaching at the University of Paris. Then he spent almost ten years in Dominican monasteries in the vicinity of Rome lecturing in Theology and Philosophy. In 1268 he came back to the University of Paris and taught there till 1272. "There he was engaged in three different controversies: (i) Against a group of conservative Theologians who were critical of his philosophical innovations (ii) Against certain radical advocates of Aristotelianism or Latin Averroism and (iii) Against some critics of dominican

and Franciscan and their right to teach at University".¹

In 1272 he was sent to Naples in order to erect a "Dominican Studicium Generale" where he continued his Professorial activity until 1274, where Pope Gregory X summoned him to attend the council but he died on the way at the Cistercian monastery of Fossanuova between Naples and Rome on March 7, 1274.²

Section B

His philosophy is a result of rethinking of Aristotelianism. It also reflects some of the thinking of The Greek Commentators on Aristotle and of Cicero, Avicenna, Averroes, and Maimonides besides stoicism, Neo-Platonism and Augustinianism. He was not subservient to the authority of Aristotle. As he himself says, "The object of philosophical study is not to know one's opinion of Aristotelian philosophy but the truth of things."³ He was a Catholic first and an Aristotelian afterwards. His philosophy is a complete reconstruction; therefore in certain fundamentals he is more Platonic than Aristotelian.⁴ Thus Aquinas had a very realistic and dynamic approach in Philosophy. He believes that man's opinion limits the circle of his thought in Philosophy and that the rethinking and reconstruction should continue till the truth of certain concept is found out. Consequently his philosophy is not a result of darting and sweeping concepts based upon the opinions of others but it is a rethinking of the Aristote-

lian Philosophy.

Aquinas believes that "God and angels are pure forms⁵ without matter but man is not a pure spirit, he possesses a soul or form which is united with a material body. In this sense he adopted Aristotle's definition of soul as the "form or actuality of an organic body"⁶. The union of matter and form gives rise to concrete individual existence or substance. There is a scale of existence, a chain of being, in the universe. At the lower end of which are the inorganic substances, whilst at the summit is God, a purely spiritual Being. There is also a hierachical order in non-living objects. In the lodestone the form seems to display certain activities over and above its function of conferring being of a definite kind upon the matter which it forms. When we ascend the scale, we reach a point at which form manifests powers⁷ and activities apart from the matter in which it is realized. The living plant has a nutritive soul, and animal has a sensitive soul and the form is able to organize the matter to a further degree of perfection but plant's vital activities are exercised on the material level while animal has sense organs and is able to receive the form of an object without its matter and higher animal is capable of forming mental images too.

But man is a creature who can transcend immediate percep-

tion by the use of reason. Because human soul is the highest and noblest of forms, it excels corporeal matter in its power by the fact that it has an operation and a power in which corporeal matter has no share whatever. This power⁸ is called the intellect.

Soul is simply that by which we live. As soon as the first sign of life appears, soul is present.⁹ He accepted¹⁰ the principle viz., "the unity of Form". Only one substantial form can be realized in the matter of an object as the human soul is the substantial form of the body, which is intellectual soul. This intellectual soul contains the sensitive and nutritive soul; it means that it contains all inferior forms and itself alone does, whatever the imperfect forms do in other things. Thus St. Thomas Aquinas represents "the powers of the soul in ascending hierachical order as vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive and intellectual".¹¹

¹²"He is a definite opponent of materialism". In respect of sense-perception he follows Aristotle closely. He admits that sense is necessary to intellect "Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu".¹³ He further says, that sense is not a material faculty, it receives the form of an external object without its matter. To him, to believe that like is known by like is an error of Greek

thinkers, who thought that the form of the object known must be in the knower in the same way as it existed in the object. Aquinas rejects this and says nothing corporeal can affect that which is immaterial "*Nihil corporeum imprimere potest in rem incorporeum*".¹⁴ He also steers clear of "sub-¹⁵jective idealism.

He further distinguishes between sense in potentiality and sense in actuality. In the former case, the actual object is external to the soul, in the latter, the sensible form in the object and the soul are one. "The distinction between the knower and the object known has been partially¹⁶ transcended in the act of knowing.

He recognizes five external senses arranged in hierarchical order. Vision is the highest because it is the least material touch. These senses are imperfect due to matter. There is also a common sense which is able to discriminate between the reports of different senses and relate them to the object perceived which is through mental images (*Phantasmata*). At the sense level other powers are *vis.*, '*Aestimativa*' and *vis.*, '*cognitativa*'. Former Leads an animal to recognize the utility or the harmful properties of an object. And the latter implies a kind of judgement and choice. But in human being instinct directed by intelligence is the *vis.*, cognitive, this is particular reason. Thus in this

hierarchical arrangement of the powers of the soul we find, we are brought by stages to the very threshold of reason. The higher powers of sense in their operation foreshadow the activities of the intelligence. As he himself says, "The cognitive and memorative powers in man owe their excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part, but to a certain affinity and approximity to the universal reason, which, so to speak, overflows into them".¹⁷

Human soul has the power of thought which is not exercised through a bodily organ. "Like the soul of the brute, the human soul is the form of body, but unlike the former, since it does not need a bodily organ, and what can function per se, can exist per se, it is a self-subsisting spiritual substance".¹⁸

Angelic intelligences are pure forms, above the human soul, knowing immaterial things intuitively without any process. Man occupies the intermediate position between lower forms of animals and pure form or spiritual existence, i.e. angel. Here he differs from Aristotle regarded man as "a little higher than the dogs and cattle while he lays emphasis on his kinship with the angels".

About the creation of soul he says that soul and body were created simultaneously by God who infused soul into body

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from without.

In respect of individuality he regards "matter as the principle of individuation because Form is universal and is common to all members of the species.²⁰

He further says that soul is immortal. To prove the immateriality of the soul, he based his argument upon the fact that the essence of a material body consists of extension in three dimensions. Extension is due to the presence of the form of corporeality. "All matter is clothed with the form of corporeality so that if anything is incorporeal, it must be immaterial".²¹ Secondly he develops another view, due to Averroes, which depends on the doctrine of "indeterminate dimensions".²² But later he was not satisfied and he says one cannot define a particular, one can only point out to all.

He further argues that "matter taken in its general meaning is not the principle of individuation but only 'materia signata' - i.e. matter in a determinate sense.²³ In other words, matter under determinate dimension". The term 'materia signata' seems to have been borrowed from Avicenna who calls it 'materia demonstrata'.²⁴ Thus the distinction of corporeal things is due to 'materia signata', e.g. Plato and Socrates are both men by virtue of possessing

the form of humanity but Plato is distinguished from Socrates by his *materia signita*, i.e. in disposition, temperament and character they are different personalities".²⁵

"The soul eventually, depends upon certain features of the individual's environment, his use or misuse of free will and his co-operation with the Creator through the Means of Grace".²⁶ Man's fully developed personality, however, is largely due to the individual's own effort and the environmental influences brought to bear upon him. His original disposition can be modified through experience, training and education and as a creatures possessing free will they can build up for themselves certain qualities of character which can be further refined and developed through the Operation of Divine Grace. Soul's individuality is due to the quantified matter of the body. But in the case of human soul, God is the agent who adapts each soul to a particular body, and it is because of His efficient causality that the soul becomes the soul of a particular body, thus "the human souls are individuated according to their bodies, but not as though the individuation were caused by their bodies".²⁷

To him the "rational soul survives the death of the body and is immortal".²⁸ Because man has a 'natural craving' or complete knowledge. And in this mortal world partial satisfaction is possible, through the exercise of reason. After

death the redeemed soul achieves the perfection of knowledge²⁹ in the Beatific vision of the Blessed Trinity. "Soul without its body is not truly a human being. Reason demands a final resurrection of the body so that the soul can enjoy³⁰ once more that perfection of being for which it craves.

The intermediate position of man, between corporeal nature and purely spiritual existence, is the key to the understanding of the activities of the intellect. Therefore "the human soul, although it is united to the body as its form,³¹ has a being elevated above the body and not depending on it".

Human knowledge in this present life is based on data received through sense perception and stored up by means of imagery. Abstraction is the outstanding feature of the operation of thought, and through abstraction the mind, setting aside all the individualizing conditions of objects, can rise to the consideration of the universal. Universals, however, have no existence apart from the concrete things in which they are realized. Thus Aquinas takes his stand³² as a "Moderate Realist". Universals are obtained by abstraction from sense particulars; and because man is a body-soul, a process is necessary.

Man has to gather knowledge from individual things by means of the senses. Human intellect is in potentiality with

regard to things intelligible and is first like a clean tablet on which nothing is written.

The human intellect must understand through composition and division. It first grasps something about its object, then it understands the properties and accidents and the various relations of the essence. He denies that universals may be innate or discovered by the mind within itself, but he says universals are derived from sense images by the process of abstraction through the agency of active intellect.

He makes a sharp distinction between knower and the object known in potential knowledge. Thus he rejects the subjective idealism.
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As it is said that man is a spiritual being with a material body and this nature of man restricts his thought in two ways. His intellect is only potentially capable of knowing, and a process of learning is necessary by which potentiality is transformed into actuality, and he is limited to what is abstracted from data accumulated by sense perception. Aquinas does not accept that human intellect can attain knowledge of Divine Essence in this present life. He further says that we can know that God exists, but not what He is.

Aquinas rejects the a Priori form of proof in favour of the a posteriori and argues from the effects of God's causality to His existence. As everything, in motion must be moved by another. If the mover also is in motion, then it must have been set in motion by some other mover. Therefore, we must grant a first mover which itself is unmoved. This First mover is God. Secondly he proves the existence of God on the basis of causality like Albert the Great and Avicenna. We find a causal series. Thus if there is no first efficient cause, there can be no middle term nor a final effect which is not possible. Therefore first efficient cause is God. Third proof springs, from the ideas of the possible and the necessary beings for the existence of God. He argues that all beings are contingent beings therefore, we must assume a Being existing necessarily, and this Being is God. Fourthly we find different grades of perfection existing in nature in a series so that the most perfect Being, God, must exist. Again he says that we see that all objects are ordered to some end, it demands a purposive intelligence directing all things to their appropriate ends, such a supreme intelligence is God.³⁴

In short Divine Nature is such that³⁵ "it is wholly beyond the grasp of any finite intelligence." He can only be described by the negative method. These five proofs show only that God exists and not what he is. But Analogy, however,

does give us a positive knowledge of God. On the basis of our experience of the world of finite existence we attain the knowledge of the infinite First cause.

He further says, "No diversity exists in the Divine Nature and God is none other than His goodness, wisdom, ³⁶ truth, justice and all His other attributes.

To know God in His Essence is "a reward of the redeemed ³⁷ soul in heaven". Beatific vision is bound up with his view concerning the supreme end of man. Like Aristotle he also "accepted that life proper to man is a life in accordance with the exercise of his highest faculty, that of intelligence and it is in the complete fruition of his intellectual ³⁸ desires that each individual will find his good". No created good can satisfy the human soul and worldly things cannot give him perfect happiness. He believes "in the primacy of intellect over will, and therefore, to him, happiness consists in an act of understanding and the supreme end of man lies in the knowledge of God, the 'Summum Bonum', that is to know God in His Essence, and such is the completeness and perfection of this act of understanding and love that it merits the name of vision. But the intellectual vision for man is not possible in this present life but it is only possible ³⁹ by grace, and he can see "God as though seeing an object ⁴⁰ reflected in a mirror". This capacity is lost due to

the Fall.

Now we can say that the object of intellect is being and universal truth but it is impossible to achieve its object in one single act of intuition like angels because man's nature lies in between animal and the separate intelligences, but it (intellect) can attain its object through the laborious path of learning. Therefore Aquinas makes careful and systematic analysis of the human act.

'The nature of the human will is to incline towards universal good but in practice it is always concerned with particular good'. And the will remains free to choose or
⁴¹
 reject them.

He further distinguishes between the psychological or subjective aspect of an action, the order of intention as he calls it, and the practical and objective, the order of execution. Every voluntary action is performed in order to attain an end or a good but this end is the last the order of execution and first in intention. Thus moral action is very complex and consists of the interplay of the intellect and the will. The first step is taken by intellect, though no human act can be apart from the will, volition can be exercised only with regard to an end which has previously been presented to the intelligence. Our will necessarily

tends to thing which is universally good and such a good is happiness, but if the thing is good only from certain point of view we can reject it too and being deficient it may be regarded as not good. If the good or end is approved by the will, intellect may judge that the end is one worth seeking. If the attainment of the end is possible, individual decides that he will pursue it. Then he makes use of his cognitive powers to find suitable means for carrying out his desire. Now the next step for the will is to give assent to the employment of the means. There may be considerable delay before the final consent of the will is obtained since the consideration of the means may be every a complicated process of deliberation involving much detailed planning. The whole of sequence so far belongs to the orders of intention.

Now we come to the order of execution. The agent makes up his mind to employ the means due to the mature reflection. He follows his decision by putting into effect the action or series of actions he had chosen. If the action is successful and the end is achieved, the process ceases and man feels happy at the satisfaction of his desire. With this background of the conception of God, nature of soul and analysis of the voluntary action of Thomas Aquinas, we shall discuss problem of evil.

Section C

Thomas Aquinas as a theistic philosopher believes that
 "Every, thing, that in any way is, is from God. God is the
 first exemplary cause of all things. It is also said
 "The Lord has made all things for Himself". It means in
 willing this universe, God did not will the evil. But now
 the question arises; did not God foresee the evil in the world,
 and if He foresaw the evils in the world and yet willed the
 world; did not God will the evil in the world? Now it be-
 comes a theistic problem, that is, the belief in God who is
 both omnipotent and good, incompatible with the fact of Evil,
 i.e., how can all good God create a world in which there is
 evil?

In solving this perplexing question, Aquinas agrees
 with Augustine, 'that evil is the privation of good', because
 "evil is neither a being nor a good" as Dinnysi, O. says,

"The being and the perfection of any nature is
 good, therefore evil cannot signify any being,
 or any form or nature but it signifies only some
 absence of good or goodness or perfection in being
 or in action. But it does not mean that evil is not
 a fact, it simply shows that it is like a wound in
 being or defect in action. It is important by virtue
 of what is lacking. And this lacking is the priva-
 tion of good."

This privation is two-fold. One privation as a result (Privatum esse), and this leaves nothing, but takes all away, e.g., blindness takes away sight altogether; darkness takes away light etc. In this privation, there can be no medium in respect of the proper subject.

The other is privation in process (privari) e.g., sickness is privation of health; not that it takes health away altogether, but that it is a kind of road to the entire loss of health, brought about by death. And since this sort of privation leaves something, it is not always the immediate contrary of the opposite habit. It is in this way that evil is a privation of good, as Simplicius says in his commentary on the categories, "For it (evil) does not take away all good, but leaves some. Consequently, there can be something, intermediate between good and evil."⁴⁷ And this intermediate thing is privation. This privation has the nature of Evil. Evil is not nature.

But some criticise that every difference which constitutes a species is a nature. And evil is also a difference constituting a species in the field of moral, i.e. bad habit differs in species from a good habit, therefore evil signifies a nature. Secondly, evil is being and a nature because it acts, for it corrupts good.

But Aquinas argues that "good and evil are not constitutive differences except in moral matters which receives their species from the end, which is the object of the will, the source of all morality;⁴⁸ that is the good is in itself but evil is the absence of the due end. Thus, therefore, the evil which is constitutive difference in morals is a certain good joined to the privation of another good, just as the end proposed by the intemperate man is not the privation of the good of reason, but the delight of sense against the order of reason. Hence evil is not as such a constitutive difference.

He further argues that a "thing is said to act in three-fold senses (i) Formally, as whiteness makes white, and in that sense evil corrupts good, for it is itself a corruption. (ii) In another sense, to act effectively as painter paints a wall white, (iii) As a final cause, as the end is said to come to effect by moving the efficient cause. But evil in these last two senses does not affect anything of itself". Therefore evil is not a positive entity but only absence of good.⁴⁹

And this privation or absence is possible only in being or in action. Privation of good in action is called moral evil. Aquinas like Augustine considers only these two types of evil. First we will discuss the evil in being.

Aquinas says that being in itself is good because all beings emanate from universal cause - God. Thus contingent beings owe their existence to the necessary Being or finite being must proceed from God who is all good.⁵⁰ Therefore being cannot be evil in themselves. But evil is found in beings, because there are different grades of beings or goodness. First type of being or goodness is incorruptible⁵¹ while other is corruptible. As Augustine also says "that one can misuse the virtue (the great good), i.e., bodily goods⁵² and other goods can be used wrongly. Evil thus, consists, namely, in the fact that a thing fails in goodness"

But he justifies evil as a corruption in beings by the argument that God or another agent makes what is better in every single part, except in relation to the whole and the whole is -- all the better and more perfect; if there be something in it which can fail in goodness and which we do sometimes fail without God preventing it, as fire cannot be generated if air was not corrupted, not would the life of lion be preserved unless the asses were killed. And "the cause of this inequality is nothing other than Divine wisdom,⁵³ i.e. God.

Secondly it is good because "the subject of evil is good."⁵⁴ As Augustine also says, "evil exists only in good".⁵⁵ Because evil indicates the absence of good but every absence

of good is not evil as the absence of the swiftness of the roe - - in man is not evil but the absence of good, taken as privative sense, is an evil. And the subject of privation⁵⁶ and of form is one and the same. The form, which makes a thing actual is a perfection and a good. Hence, every actual being is a good, and potential being is also good because it has the potentiality of being good. Similarly the subject of evil is good because if there is no good there is no question of evil.

Now it is clear that the evil cannot exist in itself but it is possible only in being or good in the form of privation which is corruption. Here question arises "whether evil corrupts the whole good or a part? Aquinas says Evil cannot wholly consume good⁵⁷ because it is privation of good, if there is no good how can privation be possible as the blindness consumes the whole sight but the other goods of body or being cannot be consumed. He further argues that⁵⁸ "there are threefold good". One kind of good is wholly destroyed by evil and this is the good opposed to evil as light is wholly destroyed by darkness. Another kind of good is neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil. This type of good is the subject of evil; as the goodness of man's being, the blindness of man cannot injured the goodness of man's being. There is also a kind of good which is diminished by evil but is not wholly taken away. This good is the

aptitude of a subject to some actuality as though there is a privation of good in form of blindness in man's being. Augustine also says, "Evil injures in-as-much as it takes
⁵⁹away good.

Again question arises why does corruption or evil happen? What is the cause of it?

Aquinas answers that "it must be said that every evil, in some way, has a cause because that anything falls short of its nature and due disposition can come only from some cause drawing it out of its proper disposition. But only good can be a cause; because nothing can be a cause except in as much
⁶⁰as it is a being, and, every being, as such, is good".

As a material cause of evil there is nothing rather than good. As a formal cause, there is no cause, because the subject of evil is good, but there is only privation of order to the proper end. "Evil, however, has a cause by
⁶¹way of an agent, not directly but accidentally".

In other words Evil has different causes in things as sometimes it is caused by reason of a defect either of the
⁶²agent or of the matter and sometimes by the power of agent. For example on the form of 'fire' there follows the privation of the form of air or of water; the fire is more perfect in

strength so it impresses its own form more perfectly and it thus, corrupts the contraries, viz., air and water. This evil is due to the perfection of fire, but it is accidental because here the aim is not the privation of air and water, therefore it is only accidentally.

Sometimes it is due to the defect in the proper effect as fire fails to heat, this happens due to the defect of action or by the indisposition of matter. Thus, it can be said that it has no direct cause, but only an accidental cause.

Sometimes the corruption of something can be referred to God as a cause because "some agent, in-as-much as it produces by its power a form which is followed by corruption and defect, causes by its power that corruption and defect".⁶³ But these are good for the order of the universe. Secondly, due to the order of justice He is the author of evil which is penalty, but not of the evil which is fault.

Evil can have an accidental cause. And it is impossible to reduce evil in any 'per se cause',⁶⁴ or it cannot be the first cause because we uphold two first principles, one good and the other evil, we find the error from the same cause. We must come at last to one first common cause though the contraries have particular causes because there cannot be a

highest evil, as the first principle of good is the highest and perfect good, although evil lessens good, yet it never wholly consumes it. The good always survives, while perfect evil cannot and if there is no good, no question of evil at all because it is privation of good and not the negation of good. That is why, it is said "If the wholly evil could be⁶⁵ it would destroy itself".

In Aquinas view "evil in the majority of cases is absolutely false". For things which are generated and corrupted, in which alone there can be natural evil, are a very small part of the whole universe. Secondly the order of the universe requires that there should be something that can and sometimes⁶⁶ do fail.

Thus he tries to solve the dilemma that of the compatibility of evil with God, on two grounds. First there is no evil that exists in itself because evil can exist only in good; it means if there is any evil; there must be good. Secondly he treats God as an artist and the universe is a work of art.

Now comes the evil in action. Before discussing the evil in action it will be better to understand the nature of man because, it is his only voluntary actions that are subject to moral judgements, that is, they are subject to

moral evil.

To Aquinas, man has an intermediate position between the non-intelligent matter as brute on one side, and angels who are pure incorporeal spirit on the other; his intellect cannot attain its object of knowing of universal truth being through single act of intuition like angels, but he acquires through laborious path of learning. Similarly his will cannot make an irrevocable choice or judgement between good and evil, like angels, who by a single act of free will are either inclined towards God or turned away from Him. But man's will by its very nature inclines towards the universal good, but in practice it is always concerned with the particular goods, which being unsatisfactory cannot determine it. So choice is made after a great swinging.

Man, who is composed of body and mind, conceives the good and has to develop his virtues by the help of concrete choices in which the good is determined by specific ends and individual circumstances. ⁶⁷ Thus, through the constant repetition of an act he develops his moral habit.

Secondly, man is free to judge and to choose while a brute has no such freedom. Though sometimes a man acts due to fear, ignorance and force but such actions have nothing to do with morality because they are non-voluntary actions.

Only conscious and free acts of a normal adult can be the subject of morality or we can say that it is his voluntary actions that are subject to moral judgements. We apply reason to determine the goodness or badness of an action. He further says that good and evil of an action as of other things, depends on its fullness of being or its lack of fullness.⁶⁸ Every action is good so far as it has being, whereas it is lacking in goodness in so far as it is lacking in something that is due its fullness of being; and thus it is said to be evil, for instance, if it lack the measure determined by reason, or its due place, or something of the kind. In other words, if good were not deficient, there would be no evil, but the action done is a deficient good, which is good in a certain respect, but evil absolutely.⁶⁹

A moral action derives its primary goodness from its suitable object and such action is called "good in its genus, e.g. to make use of what is one's own". Likewise the primary evil in moral actions comes from its object, for instance "to take what belongs to another". Though it is correct that the things (external things) are good in themselves as Augustine also says "evil is not in things⁷⁰ but in the sinner's use of them", but sometimes, they have not a due proportion to this or that action.

The whole fullness of perfection does not come only

from substantial form or the object that gives it its species, but sometimes it derives from supervening accidents or circumstances as shape and colour in man etc., if in any one of these accidents be out of due proportion, evil is the result. Similarly the fullness of the goodness of an action does not depend on only in its species (or object) but it consists also in certain other circumstances such as its due circumstances. Therefore, if "something be wanting that is requisite as a due circumstance, the action will be evil".⁷¹

Sometimes it happens that an action which is good in its species or in its circumstances is ordained to an evil end or vice-versa. However an action is not good absolutely unless it is good in all these ways; "for evil results from any single defect, but good from the complete cause" as Dionysius says.⁷²

Thus the goodness of an action can be divided into four kinds. First, that consists of its genus, since, as much as it has of action and being, so much has it of goodness. Secondly, that derives from its species; thirdly, that depends on its circumstances and fourthly it has goodness from its end, to which it is compared as to the cause of its goodness. Thus "an action may have one element of goodness and be wanting in another. In this way an action

that is good in its species, or in circumstances, may be directed to an evil end and vice versa. Still it is not simply a good action, unless it combines all the elements⁷³ of good.

To remove this complexity of moral action, Aquinas divides it into two parts, viz., formal element and material⁷⁴ element. Formal element relates to the end, towards which the act is directed and the material one relates to the means that are adopted to attain that end and the circumstances that are connected with the choice of the means. If all these are good the action is good; if all these are evil, the action is evil; and there is no problem. But there are some actions which may be materially good and formally evil and vice versa. For example, when "Saul persecuted the Christians, he probably sinned materially not formally. When Caiaphas spoke the truth without knowing it he said well⁷⁵ materially but ill formally. Thus in judging the action, regard must first be given to the end the agent desires and wills. According to Aristotle, one who steals to commit⁷⁶ adultery is even more an adulterer than a thief.

Thus, voluntary act can be further divided into two parts; interior act of will and the external act; and each of these acts has its object; the end is the properly the object of the interior act of the will, while the object of

the external action is that on which the action is brought to bear.⁷⁷ Thus the formal part of an action relates to the end while material part relates to the object on which the action is brought to bear. Sometimes it would seem that goodness or evil derived from the end is the same which is derived by the external object as when a man wills to steal in order to give an alms. But Aquinas says "the specific difference derived from the end is more general, and that the difference derived from an object which is essentially ordered to that end is a specific difference in relation to the former. For the will, the proper object of which is the end, is the universal mover in respect of all the power of the soul, the proper object of which are the objects of their particular acts".⁷⁸

Now we should consider the goodness or evil of the interior act of the will, i.e. end. The end of a thing is in its perfection and perfection of a thing is its goodness as already said, therefore everything is directed to good as its end.

Now question arises what type of good is its end. In Aquinas view, "Happiness is man's proper good".⁷⁹ But man is man through the possession of reason, therefore, it must be in accordance with that which is proper to reason. Thus, the proper end of an internal act of will is 'Happiness'.

Again question arises, what type of happiness is the end of interior act of will because we find different types of happiness, such as one finds happiness in table, food and sex, while another person finds it in virtue or the other higher values as in God or in vision of God.

Aquinas says the ultimate happiness does not consist in carnal pleasure, chief of which are pleasure of table, food and sex. Pleasure is for the sake of operation and not conversely. If an operation is not the ultimate end, so pleasure derived from it cannot be the ultimate happiness.

Similarly, ultimate happiness does not consist in Honour, Glory, Wealth, worldly power, goods of the body, senses, moral virtues, the act of prudence, practice of art or in contemplating God, in the knowledge of God acquired by demonstration, knowledge of God by faith, speculative sciences and knowledge of separate substances⁸⁰ though these are the different grades of goodness but not highest good.

Again question rests what type of happiness or end gives a man ultimate happiness. Aquinas says, "The supreme good is supremely the end of all. Now there is but one supreme good namely, God. Therefore, all things are directed⁸¹ to the highest good, namely God, as their end. As Aristotle says, "that which is supreme in any genus is the cause

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of everything in that genus. Therefore the cause of goodness of all things is the supreme good, viz., God, and being an end, He is the ultimate end of every end. Therefore God is the ultimate happiness of man due to His supreme good and ultimate end. It is also said, "The Lord hath made all things for Himself; and I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last."

83

Secondly every thing tends to some good as its end by its movement and it partakes of good in so far as it is like the first goodness, which is God. Therefore, by their movement and actions each thing tends to a likeness to God as to its last end.

Again, "since a thing is good so far as it is perfect, God's being is His perfect goodness; for in God, to be, to live, to be wise, to be happy, and whatever else is seen to pertain to perfection and goodness, are one and the same in God. Therefore, if a thing is good so far as it is, and if no creature is its own being, none is its own goodness, but each one is good by participating in goodness, even as by participating in being it is a being."

84

Thus the perfect happiness or ultimate end is to be found only in God who is supreme and infinite Good. He is the end of the rational and irrational creatures but it is

only rational creature, who can attain this final good by way of knowledge and love: or we can say that who can attain the vision of God in which alone perfect happiness lies. And this perfect happiness is only possible in next life, in which man can know God as He is, while in this life he can know only that God exists.

Lastly we can say that the ultimate end of a man is happiness which lies in the vision of God. In Aquinas words the last end of man and of any intelligent substance is called happiness or beatitude, for it is this that every intellectual substance desires as its last end, and for its own sake alone. Therefore the last beatitude of happiness of any intellectual substance is to know God. As it is said (Matt. V.B.) "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God; and (Jo XVII 3). This is eternal life, that they may know thee, the only true God".⁸⁵

But to know God in His essence is not possible in this life, because end is man's natural appetite, when he has obtained it, he desires nothing more; because if he still has a movement towards something, it means he has not attained its last end since the more man understands the more is the desire to understand Him, unless perhaps there be someone who understands all things. Therefore, the ultimate happiness is not possible in this life.

Secondly man naturally shuns death and is sad about it, because it is but the nature of man to avoid death. He avoids it not only at the moment when he feels its presence, but also when he thinks about it. But man in this mortal life, cannot escape death, therefore, "it is not possible
86
for man to be happy in this life".

Thus man's ultimate happiness (the ultimate end) will consist in that knowledge of God which the human mind possesses after this life, "hence lord promises us a reward - - -
87
in heaven".

Thus, consequently, we can say that those actions would be morally good which lead to or are compatible with the attainment of such beatitude, happiness or ultimate end, that is, God; while those actions would be morally evil which are incompatible with the attainment of such beatitude.

But to judge the action, end is only one part, the other is material one, i.e., circumstances and means. Therefore Aquinas says that end does not justify the means.

After this, Aquinas discusses the external or material aspect of the act which primarily consists of means and circumstances.

External acts may be said to be good or evil in two ways. First, in regard to their genus, and circumstances connected with them. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or evil from its relations to the end. End is the proper object of will, so the nature of good and evil is to be found first of all in the act of the will. On the other hand, the goodness or malice which the external act has of itself, in that it is about due matter and is attended by due circumstances, is derived from the reason. Thus actually the goodness or evil of an external act in so far as it comes from reasons ordination and apprehension, it is prior to the goodness of the act of the will, but if we consider it in so far as it is in the execution of the act done, it is subsequent to the goodness of the will, which is its principle.⁸⁸

"Actually voluntariness applies not only to the interior act of the will, but also to external acts, in-as-much as they proceed from the will and the reason. In reality the difference of good and evil is applicable to both the internal and external acts, i.e. a man sins by his will, not only when he wills an evil and but also when he wills an evil act.⁸⁹ "Sometimes the goodness or malice of the interior act is the same as that of the external act and sometimes not". As a bitter medicine is good merely because it procures health. Therefore there are not two goodness, the goodness of health and the goodness of the draught but one and the same. But when the external act has goodness or malice of itself, i.e., according to its matter and circumstances, then the goodness of

external act is distinct from the goodness of the will derived from the end; yet so that the goodness of the end passes into the external act, and the goodness of the matter⁹⁰ and circumstances passes into the act of will.

Thus internal and external acts are different as realities but they combine to form one thing in the moral order. Circumstances are those conditions which are outside the substance of an act, and yet in some way touch the human act.

Circumstances are related to acts in both these ways. For some circumstances, that have a relation to acts, belong to the agent otherwise than through the act, e.g., place and condition of person; whereas others belong to the agent by reason of the act, e.g., the manners in which the act is⁹¹ done.

The circumstances which is outside the substance of an act touches the act in three ways, (1) It touches the act itself, either as a measure, as time and place or by qualifying the act as the mode of acting (ii) It touches cause of act, as to the final cause, by the circumstances why; as the material cause, in the circumstances about what; as to the principal efficient cause, in the circumstances who; and as to the instrumental efficient cause, in the circumstances by

what aids. (iii) It touches the effect, when it is considered
 92
 that what is done.

Tully gives seven circumstances in his Rhetoric, which
 are contained in the verse.

Quis quid Ubi quibus auxili is cur quomodo quando
 93
 who, what, where, by what aids, why, How, and When.


The circumstances viz., why, it is done and what is done
 are the most important, because the object or motive of the
 will is the end. And in voluntary action, the object of will
 has a importance. Therefore these circumstances touch the
 act on the part of end, viz, the circumstance why and second
 which touches the very substance of the act, viz., the circum-
 94
 stance what he did.

"The fullness of the perfection of an action lies not
 wholly in its species, but some additional perfection is
 conferred in the way of accidents or due circumstances.
 Hence, if any thing be wanting that is requisite in point of
 95
 due circumstances, the action will be evil.

Thus Thomas Aquinas believes that if end (interior act
 of will) and means and circumstances (external act and circum-
 stances) are all good, act is good or if one of them is evil,
 action is evil.

Now there remains the question as to why a man is moved towards a wrong end and why does he choose wrong means? Man is free to do good and to commit evil, because he has freedom of will and intellect also. Now it is obvious that when a man is misled for this, his very will is responsible.

Thus will plays an important role in voluntary action, i.e. moral action. Therefore, to know the evil in action we must consider the action of will. Aquinas distinguishes the act of will into two categories, i.e. first those acts which belong to the will itself immediately as being elicited by the will. Secondly those acts which are commanded by the will. These are divided and sub-divided as follows:



Now it is clear from the chart that acts are of two kinds (i) Those acts of the will whereby it is moved to the end; (ii) Those acts whereby it is moved to the means to attain the end.

With reference to the end there are three acts of the will; volition, enjoyment and intention.

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Volition or "will is the rational appetite". And every appetite is only some thing good, because appetite is nothing other than the inclination of being (good) and everything in as much as it is being and substance, is a good. Therefore will is of good. And volition is not only of the end but it is also of the means, because the nature of good, which is the object of the power of will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the means. But will cannot move to the means, as such, unless it is moved to the end, since the end is willed in itself, whereas the means, as such, are willed only for the end. In other words, we can say that will is a rational appetite and it moves towards not only end but towards means too.

This will is moved by the intellect. Will is good in general, which has the nature of an end, and the object of intellect is universal Being and Truth. The object moves, by determining the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are specified, as heating by heat. By this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it. Sometimes it is moved by the sensitive appetite, because the things that which is apprehended under the nature of what is good and

befitting moves the will as an object. And man sometimes is affected by a passion, because something seems to him fitting. But sometimes will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means. On the other hand exterior principle can move the will, as its object, offered to the senses. Similarly it is also maintained that heavenly bodies also have an influence directly on the will. Lastly God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover to the universal object of the will, which is the good. And without this universal motion man cannot will anything. But man determines himself by his reasons to will this or that, which is a true or apparent
 97
 good.

The will wills something naturally because it follows the act of the intellect and intellect understands something naturally. As will tends naturally towards 'good in general' knowledge of truth, which befits the intellect, and to be live and other like things which regards his natural well-being - all of which are included in the object of the will
 98
 as so many particular goods. In other words there are two types of movement of will. First, as to the exercise of its act; secondly as to the specification of its object, derived from the object. As to the first way, no object moves the will necessary, for no matter what the object be, it is man's power not to think of it, and consequently not to will actually. But as to the second manner of motion the will is moved

by one object necessarily. If the will be offered an object which is good universally and from every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all, since it cannot will the opposite. If, on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend to it of necessity. Though passions of sensitive appetite moves the will in so far as the will is moved by its object, in as much as a man judge something to be filling and good, which he would not judge thus were it not for the passion. There will is not moved of necessity by the lower appetite. As it is said "The lust shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it" (Gen iv-7).⁹⁹ But the will is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God. The will is an active principle that is not determined to one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things, God so moves it that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, lest its movement remains contingent and not necessary,¹⁰⁰ except in those things to which it is moved naturally.

Second act of the will in reference to the end is¹⁰¹ 'enjoyment'. Enjoyment (fruition) is an act of the appetitive power because the end and the good is the object of the appetitive power. As Augustine says "To enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own sake. But this is for those only that are endowed with knowledge. And knowledge of the end is of two folds, perfect and imperfect.

Perfect knowledge of the end is that by which we know not only what it is that is the end and the good, but also the universal nature of the end and the good; and such knowledge belongs to the rational nature alone. Consequently, enjoyment in its perfect nature, belongs to the rational nature; to irrational animals, imperfectly; and to other creature, not at all. Similarly Augustine says, "It is not so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy their foods and bodily pleasure". The notion of fruit implies two things: first, that it should come last; second, that it should calm the appetite with a certain sweetness and delight. Now a thing is last either absolutely or relative. Therefore the last end alone is that which man does not desire for the sake of something else. Thus the enjoyment is of the last end. It is possible to enjoy the end even though it be not possessed. To enjoy implies a certain relation of the will to the last end, according as the will possesses something as a last end. And end is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly. Perfectly when it is possessed not only in intention but also in reality; imperfectly, when it is possessed in intention only. Perfect enjoyment, therefore, is of the end already possessed. Augustine also speaks of perfect enjoyment.

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Now we must consider intention, the third act of the will. Intention belongs first and principally to that which

moves to the end, as an architect moves other by his command to that which he intends. Similarly this is the will that moves all the other powers of the soul to the end. Intention is always of the end, it need not always be of the last end, therefore, one can intend several ends at the same time because two things may be taken in two ways.

The acts of the will which are related to the means that is, those acts whereby it is moved to the means. There are three acts of the will in reference to the means viz., (1) to choose, (2) to consent and (3) to use.

103

Choice is an act of will, because choice is nothing other than the desire and desire is an act of the will. Reason proceeds the will and directs its acts, namely, in so far as the will tends to its objects according to the order of reason; for the apprehensive power presents to the appetite its object. Accordingly, that act whereby the will tends to something proposed to it as being good, through being ordained to the end by the reason, is materially an act of the will, but formally an act of the reason. Therefore, choice is substantially, not an act of reason, but of the will; for choice is accomplished in a certain movement of the soul towards the good which is chosen. It is only of the means to the end or sometimes also of the end but the last end is in no way a matter of choice, e.g. in

the work of physician health is the end, and so it is not a matter of choice for physician, but a matter of principle. But the health of the body is ordained to the good of the soul, and consequently, with one who has charge of the soul's health, health or sickness may be a matter of choice. It is that choice is always in regard to human acts. Choice is of those things only that are done by us. The end is either an action or a thing. And when the end is either an action or a thing. And when the end is a thing, some human actions must intervene and this either in so far as man produces the thing which is the end and the same for means. It is only of possible things. It is always concerned with our actions. Now whatever is done by us is possible to us. Therefore we must needs say that choice is only of possible things. And man makes this choice freely. Man wills happiness of necessity, nor can he will not to be happy or to be unhappy. Now since choice is not of the perfect good, which is happiness, but of other end particular goods. Therefore man chooses, not of necessity, but freely.

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Choice is preceded by counsel. Choice is an act of reason and reason must of necessity institute an inquiry before deciding on what is to be chosen and this inquiry is called counsel. And this counsel is not of the end but of the means too. And this is only of things that we are able to do. The inquiry of counsel must needs be one of resolution,

beginning, that is to say, from that which is intended in the future, and continuing until it arrives at that which is to be done at once.

The second act of will which are related to the means
105
is consent. It is an act of appetitive power. But it is not in irrational animals, because, in irrational animals, the determination of the appetite to a particular thing is merely passive whereas consent expresses a determination of the appetite, which is active rather than merely passive. It is directed only to the means as counsel is only about the means. It belongs to the higher part of the soul because as long as a man is uncertain whether he should resist or not, according to divine principles, no judgement of the reason can be considered as a final decision. And final decision of what is to be done is the consent to the act. Therefore consent to the act belongs to the higher reason, but in the sense in which the reason includes the will.

Now we consider the third act of the will relation to the means to the end. The use of a thing signifies the application of that thing to an operation; and hence the operation to which we apply a thing is called its use. And it is the will which moves. The soul's powers to their acts; and this is to apply them to operation. Therefore use ,

principally, belongs to the will as first mover; to the reason as directing; and to the other powers as executing the operation, which powers are compared to the will, which applies them to act, as the instrument are compared to the principal agent. Therefore, use is an act of the will, use signifies the application of one thing to another now that which is applied to another is regarded in the light of a means to an end; and consequently use always applies to the means. ¹⁰⁶ And it follows choice. ¹⁰⁷ The will, in a way, moves the reason also, and uses it, we may take the use of the means as consisting in the consideration of the reason, whereby it refers to means to the end. In this sense use precedes choice.

The act of the will is commanded by us because whatever is in our power is subject to our command. But most of the acts of the will are in our power, that is voluntary actions. And not only the acts of the will are commanded by us but the acts of the reason are also commanded by us because the act of the reason are accomplished through free choice and by his free choice man inquires, considers, judges and approves. And the acts of sensitive appetite are also the subject of the command of reason as Gregory says, "that which obeys reason is two fold, the concupiscible and the irascible" ¹⁰⁸ which belongs to the sensitive appetite.

On the other hand the acts of the vegetative soul are not subject to the command of reason because they proceed from the natural appetite not from intellectual appetite.¹⁰⁹ In this way the external members of the body are not subject to the command of reason if they are moved by the natural powers. But if they are moved by the sensitive power they are subject to the command of reason.

In short except natural appetite or vegetative soul, all human acts are subject to the command of reason. Hence they are good ones if they are subject to the command of reason and they are evil ones if they are commanded by lower appetite.

He further argues that human actions are also guided by some principles viz., Intrinsic and Extrinsic. Intrinsic principles are powers and habits of man and extrinsic ones are Devil, inclining to evil and God who both instructs us by means of His law and Grace.¹¹⁰

In conclusion we can say that in Aquinas view God did not will the universe which contained evil in it. God necessarily loves His own essence which is infinite goodness and He freely wills creation as a communication of His goodness. He cannot love what is opposed to goodness namely evil.

Moreover, evil as such cannot be willed even by a human will, for the object of the will is necessarily the good or what appears as such. The adulterer does not will the evil, the sin precisely as such; he wills the sensible pleasure of an act which involves evil. No will, therefore, can desire evil precisely as such, and God in creating a world the evil of which he foresaw must be said not to have willed the evils but to have willed the world which as such is good and to have willed to permit the evils which he foresaw.

Thus, the doctrine that evil as such is a privation, St. Thomas Aquinas means to imply that evil is unreal in the case of being an illusion. Evil is not the being (entity) in the sense that it falls under the definition as a privation of good, not in its own right as a positive entity. For example lack of ability to see is not a privation in a stone because it is the mere absence of power which would be incompatible with the nature of the stone; but blindness in a man is a privation, the absence of something which belongs to the fulness of man's nature. This blindness is not, however a positive entity; it is privation of sight yet the privation existed is real; it is not apart from the being in which it exists but as existing in that being the privation is real enough.

Evil, therefore, cannot of itself and by itself cause anything, but exists and can be caused through the being in which it exists as the deformity in the will of a fallen angel. It cannot by itself can be a cause, but it is real privation and can be a cause by means of the positive being in which it exists. Indeed, the more powerful the being in which it exist, the greater is its effect.

In short, physical evil was permitted by God and even it can be said to have been willed by God. God did not will it for its own sake, of course, per se but He willed a universe, a natural order which involved at least the possibility of physical defect and suffering. By willing, God willed that capacity for feeling pain as well as pleasure which is, truly speaking, necessary for human nature. He did not will suffering as such but He willed that nature which is good and simple and contains the supreme perfection of goodness.

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CONCLUSION

In the present study, as it is shown, an attempt has been made to present an exposition of the problem of evil with a comparative spirit, i.e., in the light of christianity and Islam with special reference to St. Augustine, Imam al-Ghazali and St. Thomas Aquinas. It would be desirable at first to make a brief survey of the exposition of the problem in the system of these three philosophers.

St. Augustine, the precursor of medieval period, was born in 354 A.D. Political, social and educational systems of this period had a decisive and lasting role in shaping his mind. And he was the follower of Neo-Platonic school.

Under these circumstances he developed his philosophy and tried to solve the problem of evil through the conception of "Privation of good". For what is that which we call evil is simply the absence of good.¹

He classified evil into two categories, "Cosmic evil" and "Moral evil".

He tried to solve the Cosmic evil on different grounds. Firstly he explained it through the doctrine of "nature".² He argued that the source of all existence

(being) is God. And God is good, therefore, He can not create evil. Nature is also created by God (good) therefore, every thing in nature is good. Every thing possesses three characteristics viz., Measure, Order and Form and all these three come from God. The greatness of good depends upon the presence of these three characteristics. If these three are present in a thing in a greater form, that thing possesses a greater good. But if the presence is in a lesser form that is a lesser good, and where these three are completely absent, there is no good at all. But these three can not be absent totally in a natural thing. Thus it can be said that every thing so far as it is natural thing is good. And there is gradation in goodness. Due to these three characteristics some are higher goods and some are lower goods. The lower good, according to St. Augustine, becomes evil in respect of higher good. Therefore, evil is nothing in itself. For example the beauty of a man is greater than the beauty of an ape and the people are deceived as if the former is good and latter is evil.

He further says that evil is either corruption of measure, order or form. But even when corrupted, so far as it is a natural thing is good and it may have value, even after being a corrupt thing. For example, corrupt gold is better ³ than incorrupt silver and corrupt silver is better than incorrupt lead etc. Corruption can not consume whole

good because the good which makes it a being can not be⁴
 destroyed completely without destroying the being itself.
 Therefore no evil exists in itself. It is simply an evil
 aspect of some actual entity. In other words "Every actual
 entity is good (Ominus natura Bonum est)"⁵

St. Augustine further says that God has willed
 every thing in nature for the best of His creature. Thus⁶
 the so called evil too, is good in its own way.

In short Augustine justifies Cosmic evil through
 infinite wisdom and absolute goodness of God who ordains
 all and whose ways are beyond human understanding.

After Cosmic evil St. Augustine comes to moral evil.
 He explains moral evil on the basis of free will. He argues
 that it is but an admitted fact that God has given man free⁷
 will and it is proved by the commandments of God. If a man
 commits a sin it is not due to force or compulsion but it
 is his freewill. Thus he says that evil does not arise⁸
 from substance but from the perversion of the will. The
 will is free to turn away from the immutable good and to⁹
 turn towards mutable good. This turning towards mutable
 good is evil because this turning is towards lower good in
 comparison to higher good or immutable good, i.e., God.

Secondly he holds that man's chief good is the good of the both, the body and the soul. Mutable good is only for the body and not for soul. The good of soul is the perfect satisfaction which depends on ultimate happiness and ultimate happiness can be attained by chief good and chief good is God. Therefore the good of the soul is in God or turning of the will towards God. When a man turns towards mutable good, he loses his eternal happiness which becomes evil for him. Thus the cause of the good is in the Divine goodness, whereas the cause of evil is in the will of man which is to ¹⁰ turn away from the immutable good.

But will in itself which turns towards good is not ¹¹ evil, because it is created by God. "It is medium good". That is why it can be misused. Its nature is good but its effect can be good or bad according to the way man uses it. Now the use to be made of free choice is under the control of free choice itself.

On the basis of this free will, Augustine tries to explain the sin of Adam. Adam touched the tree of know-¹² ledge of good and evil, inspite of the prohibition from God by his free will, therefore he experienced the penalty of sin. But it does not mean that tree in itself was evil because it was planted by God in paradise and therefore assuredly was good. But He Himself who prohibited its touch was better than the tree. Therefore it was good for

Adam to turn towards God and evil to turn towards the tree.¹³
 Thus sin is concerned with the will, motive and attitude of
¹⁴
 a man.

After Augustine we now come to Al-Ghazali. Al-Ghazali
 a great theologian and a profound philosopher, was born at
 Tus in 1058 A.D., seven hundred years after St. Augustine.
 Imam Ghazali does not talk of cosmic evil. He says that
 every thing in the world is in the grip of God. He is eternal
 and everlasting, He is the first and the last. He is the
¹⁵
 first in existence and the last in experience.

Secondly there is a divine purpose linking the
 antecedents to the consequents and this divine purpose is
 manifested in the existing orderly succession of events
¹⁶
 without the least break or irregularity.

Further he says that the Divine purpose is mystical.
 Therefore every one can not know it as in the Quran it is
 said that we did not create them but with truth. But most
 of them do not know (The Quran, XLIV:38.39). Therefore for
 Al-Ghazali there is no question of any cosmic evil.

He takes the problem of moral evil which he calls
 'Shar'. Shar, Al-Ghazali defines, is the prohibitions of God
 and Khair (good) is the commandments of God. He explains the

moral evil on the basis of free will and the doctrine of "Kasab" (acquisition).

Al-Ghazali says that man has two forms, viz. Khalq and Khulq. Khalq is material and Khulq is spiritual, viz. body and soul respectively. Soul is the essence of man and it controls the body. The human soul has six powers, viz. appetite, anger, impulse, apprehension, intellect and will. These basic powers have their origin in the nature of man¹⁷ and play an important role in human actions. These basic powers are categorized by Al-Ghazali into two types: (i)¹⁸ Shaitaniyya and (ii) Rabbaniya (divine element). These two forces are contradictory forces in the human self that work through the shahwa (passion) and Ghadab (anger) for construction and destruction respectively. When the divine element continuously struggles with the human evil tendency and its struggle gets success, the self is enabled to pursue its progress unimpeded towards its goal. But if these forces are instigated by the shatanic power, they rebel against Aql (reason) and overcome it and the tendency becomes strong and gains complete ascendancy over them, as a result that divine element becomes weak till it almost becomes dead¹⁹ and the evil tendency becomes more and more stronger and continuously inciting them to gratify themselves even at the expense²⁰ of the good of the self.

Now it is clear that human heart is equally susceptible to both the elements, i.e., 'The Divine and the Shatanic'.²¹ The divine element is guided by Aql (reason) and Shatanic elements is led by Ash-Shahwa (lust), appetite and al-ghadab.²² The existence of these two contradictory powers in man shows that there is a choice for a man and this choice implies his freedom of will.

To explain free will Al-Ghazali analyses the human action. He classifies actions into three types : (1) Natural action (2) Intentional action and (3) Voluntary action. All actions in which an alternative is possible and reason makes a choice are voluntary actions. He further argues that in voluntary action, knowledge is but necessary because without it morality and good conduct are not possible.²³ Voluntary action has two aspects, viz. formal and existential. Formal is already present. Existential is acquired but both occur together.²⁴ Through knowledge man knows his end. Therefore all human actions are directed to some end. Philosophers from the very beginning have been striving their utmost to discover and to determine some such ends. This end should define the quality and character of man's behaviour endeavouring to attain it.²⁵ Al-Ghazali calls this end as Sa'ada (blessedness). In his view sa'ada of every thing consists in the realization of perfection to the nature of that

particular thing. For a man Saad al-Haqiqiya-which is the summum Bonum is the vision of God in the next world and in this world love of God is the highest Saada because Saada Al-Haqiqiya will be achieved by one's love of God and the intensity of love towards God is conditioned by one's knowledge of God, therefore, when knowledge is sought as an end, it is itself a sa'ada.

When a man understands the full significance of an object and the desirability of seeking it, yearning is aroused in him to achieve that object by adopting appropriate²⁷ means. This yearning is Irada and this Irada can be fulfilled by free will of man. To explain free will Al-Ghazali brings three realities, viz. God, mental world and physical world. Man has the middle position in between the three. His will is not completely determined like the material objects not it is absolutely free like God. This conception is called "Kasab" (acquisition) by Al-Ghazali.

It is this doctrine of acquisition on the basis of which a man is responsible for his actions and he is subject to reward and punishment.

Al-Ghazali presents a sequence theory of causation like that of Hume and rejects the efficiency theory of causation.²⁸ He defines cause in the sense of power or

efficient force when applied to things other than God. The
²⁹
 efficient cause is only one and that is God. On the other
 hand two things or events are conjoined together like rela-
 tion between the condition and conditioned by God. Certain
 conditions are evident but some can be understood only by
³⁰
 intuition. As Quran says ' Most of them do not know '.

It is in the hand of man either to use this power
 in the right direction or in the wrong direction. The
 right direction is the dominance of Quwat-i-Rabbaniya
 (Spiritual power) and wrong direction is the dominance of
 the Quwat-i-Shataniya (devil power). Evil occurs when
 Shataniya dominates.

The root of moral evils, in view of Al-Ghazali, lies
 in the love of the world, pride, love of wealth and love of
 honour etc. A man can overcome these evils through under-
 standing his own end, not only on this earth, but also in
 the next world. In other words man can save himself from
 evil through knowledge of God, love of God and ultimately
 vision of God. "Man is guided by spiritual forces and these
 forces influence him through his reason. These influences
 help man to walk on the path of Allah which is called Taufiq"
³¹
 (the guidance of God). God is just and merciful. He favours
 those who endeavour in his way. Thus the question of grace

in the philosophy of Al-Ghazali is irrevocably bound up with human effort.

After Al-Ghazali we now come to St. Thomas Aquinas. St. Thomas Aquinas was born in 1225 A.D. in Italy. He came just after a century of Al-Ghazali. He was the product of transitional period, i.e., between medieval and modern era. There is the culmination of scholasticism in his system. He was the follower of Aristotelian school, though he was influenced by Plotinus, St. Augustine, and Muslim philosophers including Al-Ghazali.

In solving the problem of evil St. Thomas Aquinas agrees with St. Augustine that evil is "privation of good". He too like Augustine classifies evil into two categories, viz. (i) Evil in being and (ii) Evil in action.

Being a theist he believes that "Every thing that
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in any way is, is from God, and God is the cause of all the causes. Therefore in his view the being and the perfection of any natural object is good and evil can not signify any being or any form of nature. Evil signifies only some absence of good. But it does not mean that evil is not a fact. It is a fact but it is simply the absence of good and this lack of good is "Privation of good."

He further says that being in itself is good because all beings are emanated from universal cause, i.e. God. Thus contingent beings owe their existence to the necessary being and proceed from God who is all good.³⁴ Therefore, being in-itself can not be evil.

Secondly like Augustine he also makes a distinction among the goods.

Thirdly, he like Augustine justifies gradation of good through Divine wisdom. To him the cause of the inequality (Gradation) is nothing other than Divine Wisdom³⁵ of God.

Fourthly, the subject of evil, is good, i.e., evil can not exist in itself but it exists only in good. Therefore evil is good in itself.

Thomas Aquinas explains moral evil on the basis of free will like St. Augustine and Al-Ghazali. In explaining freedom of will he makes a thorough analysis of human actions. In the analysis of human actions he agrees with Al-Ghazali and differs from Augustine. Primary evil in action,³⁶ in his opinion, comes from its object. But some times it is derived from supervening accidents or circumstances as shape and colour etc. Therefore, if some thing be wanting

that is requisite as a due circumstances, the action will be evil.³⁷ Thus according to St. Thomas Aquinas the goodness of an action depends on two elements, viz. (1) formal element which relates to the end towards which the act is directed and (ii) the material one which relates to the means that is adopted to attain that end and circumstances that are connected with the choice of the means. If all these are good, the action is good; if all these are bad³⁸ the action is evil.

The end which is the formal part of the action, is happiness as St. Thomas Aquinas holds; it is man's proper good and it must be in accordance with that which is proper to reason.³⁹ Such type of happiness only lies in the vision⁴⁰ of God because God is supreme good and ultimate end. Therefore by their movement and action, all things turn towards God as their last end. Such type of vision is not possible in this life because end in man's natural appetite. When he obtains it, there remains no more desire to attain for him; because if he still has a movement towards something,⁴¹ it means he has not attained its last end. Therefore it can not be attained in this life, but in the life hereafter. He, therefore, argues that those actions which are compatible with the attainment of such beatitude happiness or ultimate end are good and those are evil which are impediments with the attainment of such beatitude. And end does

not justify the means because it is a part of the whole action. Hence St. Aquinas is in complete agreement with Al-Ghazali because for Al-Ghazali too, vision of God is Summum Bonum and the actions leading towards that vision are good and the actions which mar this vision are evil.

The external act may be said to be good or evil in two ways, first in regard to their genus and circumstances connected with them. Secondly a thing is to be good or evil from its relation to the end.⁴²

Circumstances are those conditions which are outside the substance of an act and yet in a way touch the human act. And the most important circumstances are, "Why" and "what he did".⁴³ If any thing be wanting that is, its requisite in spite of due circumstances the act will be evil.⁴⁴ Thus if internal (end) and external (circumstances and means) are good, act is good; if one of them is bad action is evil.

After explaining evil St. Thomas Aquinas turns towards will because there is nothing other than will which misleads for choosing wrong and means.

Actions under will are of two kinds. First are those acts which belong to the will itself immediately as

being stimulated by the will and secondly are those which are commanded by the will.

First type of action is done towards end and means. In relation to end will wills good, because it is rational and the like inclines inclination to the like.⁴⁵ Secondly it arrives at the terminus through the middle ground. But if volition is of the end it is also of the means. The will moves the other powers of the soul of their acts. And will is moved by the intellect because the object of intellect is also universal being like the Truth as the object of will. But sometimes it is moved by the sensitive appetite because man is affected by passions. In short some times it is moved by the interior object (intellect, sensitive appetite and will itself). And at others, it is moved by exterior object, i.e. by God.

The notion of will, to him, is natural, i.e. the will wills something naturally. It is not moved out of necessity, neither by the interior object not by the exterior object.

But he argues that though the action of will is free to move towards its end and to choose its means, but inspite of this freedom its action can be controlled by reason and reason can be controlled by man. Therefore man is responsible for the action of his will.

Human actions are also guided by intrinsic and extrinsic principles. Intrinsic principles are powers and habits of man and extrinsic principles are Devils, inclination to evil. It is God that instructs a man by means of His laws and Grace. Here Thomas Aquinas is very close to Al-Ghazali because Al-Ghazali too mentions the two powers in man, i.e., Angelic power (Quwat-Rabbaniya) and Devilish power (Quwat-i-Shaitaniya).

Thus St. Aquinas tries to solve the problem of evil through the "conception of privation of good". For physical evil he argues that God willed a universe having a natural order which involved, at least, the possibility of physical defect and suffering. God willed that capacity for feeling pain as well as pleasure. He did not will suffering as such but he willed the nature which is good. The physical evil is only the privation of this good; similarly in respect of moral evil, it is only the privation of good in man's will.

After presenting the basic position of these three philosophers we now come to their similarities:

First of all these three philosophers are theists and as a theists they believed that God is the supreme Being. He is all good, all wise, all powerful and all knowing. As Augustine says "God is to possess the highest good. To

Al-Ghazali "Whatever good be falleth thee" (O'man) it is from Allah"⁴⁷, and for St. Thomas Aquinas "Everything in any way is, is from God. God is the first cause of all things"⁴⁸.

Secondly, all the three philosophers are mystics. They practised mysticism and presented their mystical experience to propound their view regarding evil. We need not substantiate it as their lives and philosophy evidently prove it.

Thirdly they believe in free will and consider it to be the cause of moral evil.

Fourthly they believe in grace of God. And they give a mystical explanation to explain this conception.

Thus we see that in some of the vital points they share each other. Now after the points of similarities, we come to their differences. It would not be wrong to assert that each of these philosophers is an independent thinker and has propounded his own philosophy with his own discipline of thought. Keeping this in view we come to conclude that there must exist some differences between them. We should also note that these differences lie in the core of their thought due to their different disciplines.

We have repeatedly mentioned "The privation of good". We are aware that two of these philosophers namely St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas have defined evil, as "the privation of good". But there is a difference in their interpretation and explanation of it. St. Aquinas, inspite of adopting it does not take the same position as that of St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas like St. Augustine does believe in evil as the privation of good but unlike him he speaks of its two categories: (i) Privatum esse (Privation in essence) and (ii) Privari, (Privation in process).

So far as Al-Ghazali is concerned it is but evident that he does not believe in any concept of evil like that of 'Privation of good'. He believes that it is the divine⁴⁹ law which pronounces the actions as good or evil. Thus very first point of difference between the christian and the Muslim philosopher is regarding the definition of evil.

The another point of difference between the Christian Philosophers and the Muslim philosopher lies in the fact that St. Augustine and St. Aquinas believe in the original sin and the doctrine of redemption, but Al-Ghazali does not support these conceptions. On the basis of original sin both Augustine and Aquinas advocates the freedom of will of Adam. Al-Ghazali, too, accepts that Adam violated the command of God but whether this violation was completely in

the hand of Adam? Al-Ghazali observes silence and says that the answer of this question is the subject matter of Ilm-al Mukashafa (Intuitive knowledge) and it can not be discussed on the rational plane. He simply says that good and evil are determined by Divine Law. But man is adorned with the gift of free will and he is free to choose to do or not to do something. But man has not the absolute freedom, his freedom is limited. Only God has the absolute freedom. And thus he puts forward his theory of acquisition according to which origin of action is in God but its completion is in man.

Having discussed the similarities and differences, it is apt for us to present a resume of the discussion we have done so far. To begin with, we should make it explicit that all these three philosophers are primarily the scholars of religion. In support of our argument we only refer to their lives, works and teachings. St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas are the Christian saints. They are the ardent believers of their religion and same is the case with Al-Ghazali. He is regarded as an argument on Islam. It is but evident that the roots of their thought lie in the respective religion they followed. For Augustine and Aquinas the Bible is the source of inspiration and for Al-Ghazali, it is the Quran. We are not wrong to assert that the problem of evil

induced them towards itself because primarily it is the problem of religion. All the three took it to solve because it was interpreted in many ways by different thinkers. Some held God to be responsible for the evil. And others put all its responsibility on man, yet there was a group of atheists who challenged the omnipotency of God arguing that He could not eradicate evil from the world. Besides this there was still another controversy regarding evil as to whether evil is an illusion or a reality. Some supported the former and others held up the latter.

St. Augustine, Al-Ghazali and St. Aquinas dealt with the problem in their own way. They share each other on many points which have been discussed. These similarities are bound to come in, for both, Christianity and Islam are revealed religions and the Quran categorically says that all the Prophets from Adam to Mohammad came in world with one and the same religion. The Quran also speaks of good
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christian for recalling their value of love.

Our discussion in the preceding chapters clearly explains the position of these three philosophers. Evaluating it we assert that St. Augustine and St. Aquinas do not believe in the existence of evil in real sense but they call it as a lesser good in respect of higher good. But actually

speaking evil is evil and we can not call it either as lesser good or good in itself, for example, suffering of innocent people or blindness of a man or, earth quake etc., can not be considered as good or lesser good. Though these evils are justified by saying that God punishes the wicked nations for their evil deeds; yet what remains unexplained is the fact that innocent persons are not wicked and therefore, should not be punished but they also face these suffering.

St. Augustine and St. Aquinas tried to solve it as "privation of good;" for instance the wound is the privation of health but this theory fails to explain it. For considering evil as privation of good implies the absence of good in a thing which is good in itself because they believe that element of good is present in every thing and on this basis they made grades of the things to arrange them in hierarchic order, i.e., higher good is that good which possesses more good and on the same basis the lower is lesser good.

From this, it is evident that the absence of good is impossible because every thing has a nature which is good, therefore, there can not be 'the privation of good.' Thus the solution of evil as the privation of good seems contradictory in itself.

Secondly according to them wound and disease are nothing other than privation of health, therefore unhealthy body is lesser good in respect of healthy body. But it does not prove that these are not evil, these are evil at-least till these are present in the body. Therefore evil exists as evil. We can not justify it as to call it lesser good or privation of good.⁵¹

In the light of above discussion it becomes clear that evil is not good in any form, it is different from good.

So far moral evil is concerned the stand may be appreciated that good and evil are based on the pronouncement of God. God, in the interest of mankind, proclaimed some kinds of action as good and another type as evil. He also gave freedom of will to man, so that he may choose between good and evil. This choice would have been impossible without the alternatives and without choice free will would have no meaning and there would not be any justification for reward and punishment in the next world. That's why St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas and Imam Al-Ghazali preached the freedom of man. In this way man is responsible for moral evil as he has the free will.

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